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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 3, 1989, the European Community ("Commu-
nity") adopted the so-called "Television Without Frontiers" Di-
rective ("Directive") ,2 which was intended to facilitate the inte-
gration and harmonization of the various broadcasting laws al-
ready in place in the individual Member States of the
Community. The Directive's ultimate goal was to achieve a sin-
gle Community broadcasting market. However, the Directive
also included a highly controversial provision, the local content
requirement, which requires Community broadcasters, subject
to certain exceptions, to allocate no less than fifty percent of
their airtime to "European works,"3 as that term is defined in the
2. Council Directive No. 89/552, OJ. L 298/23 (1989) (Council Directive of Octo-
ber 3, 1989 on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid Down by Law, Regulation or
Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Pursuit of Television Broad-
casting Activities).
3. Council Directive No. 89/552, supra note 2, art 6(1)(a), OJ. L. 298/23 at 27
(1989). European works include "works originating from Member States of the Com-
munity" as well as: "works originating from European third States party to the European
Convention on Transfrontier Television of the Council of Europe," provided that:
(a) they are made by one or more producers established in one or more of
those States; or
(b) production of the works is supervised and actually controlled by one or
more producers established in one or more of those States; or
(c) the contribution of co-producers of those States to the total co-production
costs is preponderant and the co-production is not controlled by one or more
producers established outside those States.
Id. art. 6, O.J. L. 298/23, at 27 (1989).
Article Six further provides that "works originating from other European third
countries" may also be considered "European works," provided they are "made exclu-
sively or in co-production with producers established in one or more Member State by
producers established in one or more European third countries with which the Com-
munity will conclude agreements in accordance with the procedures of the Treaty, if
those works are mainly made with authors and workers residing in one or more Euro-
pean States." Id. art. 6(4), OJ. L. 298/23, at 27 (1989). Additionally, Article Six pro-
vides that works "made mainly with authors and workers residing in one or more Mem-
ber States, [may] be considered . . . European works [but only] to an extent corre-
sponding to the proportion of the contribution of Community co-producers to the total
production costs." Id. Perhaps the best way to understand this provision is by way of
example: Assume that a co-produced one-hour work is "mainly made" with British au-
thors and workers. If the production is financed 25% by a British company and 75% by
a U.S. company, only 25% of the work, fifteen minutes, would be considered a Euro-
pean work. By contrast, if the work was financed 75% by the British company and 25%
by the U.S. company, the entire work would be considered a European work, provided
that production of the work was not controlled by the U.S. company. See id. art.
6(2) (c), OJ. L 298/23, at 27 (1989); Jon Filipek, "Culture Quotas": The Trade Controversy
Over the European Community's Broadcasting Directive, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 323, 334 (1992).
One potentially important area with regard to co-productions that the Directive
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Directive. This requirement has been, and continues to be, a
thorn in the side of U.S. - Community relations.
While there was some hope that the issues surrounding the
Directive might be resolved during the recent General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") Uruguay Round negotia-
tions, such an agreement proved elusive.4 Given the parties' his-
torically antagonistic positions regarding the Directive, it should
come as little surprise that no resolution was reached during the
Uruguay Round.5 The stage has thus been set again for a con-
frontation between the parties over the Directive and its local
content requirement - a confrontation that may take place in a
variety of possible fora and that may have a number of poten-
tially serious consequences on the future of free trade generally
or with regard to trade in certain specific items.
This Article discusses the Directive and the dispute between
the United States and the Community with respect to the effect
of the Directive on the free trade of television programming.
Part II of this Article traces the background of the Directive.
Part III discusses U.S. objections to the Directive under the
GATT and the Community's responses. Part III also discusses
the potential application of U.S. trade law to the instant dispute.
Part IV assesses the parties' respective arguments and positions
and provides a recommendation for how the parties might seek
to resolve their differences. This Article concludes that offering
non-export subsidies to domestic European producers will fur-
does not address is the treatment of works Community-based subsidiaries of foreign
companies produce. Views on the proper treatment of such works have been mixed,
and this area will certainly require clarification in the future. See Filipek, supra, at 334 &
n.66.
Despite the somewhat confusing formulation contained in Article Six, the basic
principle behind what constitutes a European work essentially boils down to European
control over a given work. This principle is further supported by the definition of "Eu-
ropean audiovisual works" provided in Article 2(e) of the European Convention on
Transfrontier Broadcasting ("Convention"), which defines them as "creative works, the
production or co-production of which is controlled by European natural or legal per-
sons." European Convention on Transfrontier Broadcasting, Europ. T.S. No. 132 art,
2(e) (May 5, 1989), reprinted in 5 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTIONS AND
AGREEMENTS 242 (1990) [hereinafter Convention]. See also Filipek, supra, at 333.
4. See Keith Bradsher, The World Trade Agreement; The Overview; U.S. and Europe Clear
The Way For A World Accord on Trade, Setting Aside Major Disputes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,
1993, at Al; Roger Cohen, The World Trade Agreement; A Realignment Made Reluctantly,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1993, at D19.
5. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 343-45; W. Ming Shao, Is There No Business Like Show
BusinessFree Trade and Cultural Protectionism, 20YALEJ. INT'L L. 105, 106, 113-14 (1995).
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ther the interests of all parties while preserving respect for free
trade and the international institutions which govern interna-
tional trade.
II. THE COMMUNITY'S "TELEVISION WITHOUT
FRONTIERS" DIRECTIVE
A. Historical Overview: Trade Patterns in Audiovisuals
Sometimes world events have the effect of changing the na-
ture of international trade in certain items. World War I had
this impact on international trade in films and full-length mo-
tion pictures. Prior to the war, Europe had been the preeminent
producer of films and full-length motion pictures. The war,
however, devastated the European film industry, allowing the
U.S. film industry to fill the newly-created void.6 Thus, in the
period following World War I, U.S. film producers first began
large-scale penetration into the European film market.' Be-
tween 1913, the last year before the war, and 1925, U.S. film ex-
ports to Europe grew five hundred percent.' By the end of the
1920's, U.S. films accounted for four-fifths of all screenings in
the world.9 As a consequence, the mobile inputs of film produc-
tion, namely creative personnel and film financing, began to
gravitate across national boundaries to Hollywood.' 0
Despite the various defensive maneuvers utilized by coun-
tries against U.S. film and television exports" over the past sev-
enty years, the U.S. film and television industry 12 continued its
growth and is now, as it has been since the 1920's, the dominant
producer and provider of audiovisual programming to the vari-
ous international broadcasters and other media service provid-
6. See ROBERT SKLAR, FILM: AN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY OF THE MEDIUM 73 (1993);
KRISTIN THOMPSON, EXPORTING ENTERTAINMENT: AMERICA IN THE WORLD FILM MARKET
1907-34 61-99 (1985) (analyzing expansion of U.S. film industry into foreign markets as
a result of World War I).
7. See, e.g., Thomas H. Guback, Hollywood's International Market, in THE AMERICAN
FILM INDUSTRY 463, 488 (Tino Balio ed., 1976).
8. See SKLAR, supra note 6, at 73.
9. ANTHONY D. SMITH, THE GEOPOLITICS OF INFORMATION 41 (1980).
10. See SKLAa, supra note 6, at 95.
11. Film and television trade will be referred to in various portions of this Article
under the more general descriptive term of "trade in audiovisuals."
12. U.S. film and television industries will be referred to in various portions of this
Article under the more general descriptive term "the U.S. entertainment industry."
[Vol. 20:90
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ers.13 Recent data confirm the strength of the U.S. entertain-
ment industry's position. In 1987, the industry provided US$2.5
billion in trade surpluses to the U.S. economy, with approxi-
mately half of those revenues derived from the European mar-
ket.14 In 1988, the year before the Community adopted the Di-
rective, U.S. producers sold US$844 million worth of television
programming to Western Europe, a five-fold increase over
1980.15 By 1989, U.S. exports of television programming to
Western Europe surpassed US$1 billion. 6 By 1992, the U.S. en-
tertainment industry produced a trade surplus US$4 billion,' v
with the European Union purchasing approximately US$3.7 bil-
lion worth of U.S. films, videotapes, and television programs.,
From all indications, the trend appears likely to continue in the
absence of Community protectionist measures. 9 The U.S. en-
tertainment industry argues that the Directive is a protectionist
response by the Community to the economic consequences of
the large U.S. share of the European market and that the actual
effects of the Directive should be assessed from this economic
vantage point, as opposed to the proffered political and cultural
justifications.
B. The Green Paper
Many of the Directive's provisions have their origins in the
European Commission's ("Commission") 1984 "Television With-
out Frontiers" Green Paper ("Green Paper").2 The Green Pa-
13. See Robin L. Van Harpen, Mamas, Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up To Be Cowboys:
Reconciling Trade and Cultural Independence, 4 MINN. J. GLoBAL TADE 165, 165 n. 1 (1995)
(citing, e.g., David Rieff, The Culture that Conquered the Earth; Why Conformist Consumerism
is America's Greatest Export, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 1994, at Cl).
14. Paul Presburger & Michael R. Tyler, Television Without Frontiers: Opportunity and
Debate Created by the New European Community Directive, 13 HASTINGS INT'L & CoN. L.
RE'. 495, 501-02 (1990); see Clint N. Smith, International Trade in Television Programming
and GATT: An Analysis of Why the European Community's Local Program Requirement Violates
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 10 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAw. 97, 101-02 (1993).
15. Presburger & Tyler, supra note 14, at 502.
16. Smith, supra note 14, at 101.
17. Kirsten L. Kessler, Protecting Free Trade in Audiovisual Entertainment: A Proposal
for Counteracting the European Union's Trade Barriers to the U.S. Entertainment Industry's Ex-
ports, 26 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 563, 563-64 (1995).
18. David R. Sands, Clash of Cultures Creates Latest Block to World Trade Pact, WASH.
TIMES, Nov. 24, 1993, at B7.
19. See David J. Fox, Entertainment Industry Gets Clinton's Free Trade Pledge, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 15, 1993, at D5; see also Sands, supra note 18, atB7.
20. Commission of the European Communities, Television Without Frontiers:
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per sets forth a framework for integrating and harmonizing the
Member States' broadcasting laws21 in order to facilitate the de-
velopment of a single market for broadcasting within the Com-
munity. This single market was designed to replace the then-
existing patchwork of disparate national broadcasting laws cover-
ing each individual Member State. 2
The Green Paper observes that television in the Community
could be "a source of cultural enrichment"23 and that "[t] he dis-
semination of information across national borders can do much
to help the peoples of Europe to recognize the common destiny
Green Paper on the Establishment of the Common Market for Broadcasting, Especially
by Satellite and Cable, COM (84) 300 Final (June 1984) [hereinafter Green Paper].
21. The Green Paper sets forth various proposed standards for advertising, the
protection of minors, and limited rights of reply. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 328-31
(providing an overview of these standards). These standards, while important to the
creation of a single market, do not bear on the local content requirement which is the
subject of the instant dispute. Thus, this Article will not discuss these standards.
The claimed legal basis set forth in the Green Paper for Community regulation of
Member State broadcasting was the Treaty Establishing the European Community's
("EC Treaty") provisions regarding the free movement of goods and the freedom to
provide services, particularly Article 60, as interpreted by the European Court ofJustice
("Court ofJustice"). See Green Paper, supra note 20, COM (84) 300 Final at 105 (citing
Ex parte Giuseppe Sacchi, Case 155/73, [1974] E.C.R. 409, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 177); see
also Filipek, supra note 3, at 327 & n.18. For an interesting discussion of the Commu-
nity's competence to regulate Member State broadcasting under the EC Treaty; Wolf-
gang Hoffman-Riem, The Broadcasting Activities of the European Community and Their Impli-
cations for National Broadcasting Systems in Europe, 16 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMp. L. PEv. 599,
604-05 (1993); cf. Matthias Herdegen, After the TVJudgment of the German Constitutional
Court: Decision-Making Within the EU Council and the German Ldnder, 32 COMMON MKT. L.
REv. 1369, 1379 (1995).
22. See Green Paper, supra note 20, at 28; see also Kessler, supra note 17, at 566
(citing Janet L. Conley, Hollywood's Last Hurrah? "Television Without Frontiers" Directive
May Close Borders to the European Community's Broadcast Market, 14 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L.
87, 93 (1993)). The harmonization of Member States' laws with regard to those matters
covered under the EC Treaty is one of the fundamental principles set forth in the EC
Treaty. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty on European
Union, Feb. 7,1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.LR. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 [herein-
after TEU]. The TEU, supra, amended the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I)
[hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, OJ. L 169/1 (1987),
[1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES (EC Offl Pub. Off. 1987). Article 3(h) of the EC Treaty states that one of
the EC Treaty's goals is the "approximation of the laws of Member States to the extent
required for the functioning of the common market." EC Treaty, supra, art. 3(h),
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 589; see also id. art. 100, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 633; see GEORGE A.
BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 428-29 (1993).
23. Green Paper, supra note 20, COM (84) 300 Final at 30.
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they share in many areas."24 The Green Paper elaborates on the
role a single broadcasting market might have on further Euro-
pean integration, stating:
[B] roadcasting is a powerful medium for the communication
of all kinds of information, ideas and opinion. It thereby in-
fluences the attitudes of almost all Community citizens... (in
the areas of, inter alia,) political, social, educational and cul-
tural affairs which are associated with some of our societies'
most fundamental values. Broadcasting's role in these areas
makes it an especially important factor in the development of
the European Community as an association of democratic
States seeking to develop as an increasingly integrated eco-
nomic, social and political entity.25
The Green Paper further notes that a single broadcasting
market allowing cross-border transmissions mandated by a direc-
tive could help educate voters in deciding who should represent
them in the European Parliament 26 and might "help create a
'European consciousness' that would weaken individuals' alle-
giances to single Member States and facilitate the political inte-
gration of the European Community."27 The Green Paper also
observes that the creation of a single broadcasting market would
provide impetus for increased technological innovation in Eu-
rope in transmission media,28 which would help limit the power
the dominant American media corporations wield. 29 Interest-
ingly, the Green Paper did not discuss any need for a local con-
tent requirement, which was eventually included in the Directive
and which has generated the present controversy.
C. The Directive
The late 1980's was a busy time for Community lawmakers.
Due to the generally slow progress being made with regard to
24. Id. at 28.
25. Id. at 3.
26. Id. at 28.
27. Smith, supra note 14, at 104; See Green Paper, supra note 20, COM (84) Final
at 16.
28. Green Paper, supra note 20, COM (84) Final at 53.
29. Id. at 33. In its "Opinion of the Green Paper," the European Commission's
Economic and Social Committee "urged the fostering of an efficient television industry
so that European television producers could compete with [U.S. producers]". See
Smith, supra note 14, at 104 (citing European Commission Economic & Social Commit-
tee "Opinion on the Green Paper," 1985 OJ. (C303) 13, 14).
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harmonizing Member States' laws, in 1985, the Commission
published its "White Paper on Completing the Internal Market"
("White Paper")3" in an attempt to advance certain harmoniza-
tion efforts that had been stagnating in the legislative process.
In total, the White Paper proposed 279 legislative measures that
the Commission hoped would be resolved by 1992, including the
proposals advanced in the Green Paper. 2 The push the White
Paper generated was largely successful, with many of the pro-
posed pieces of legislation being approved, including, in sub-
stantial part, the proposals made in the Green Paper. The Coun-
cil approved the final draft of the Directive on October 3, 1989.
Substantively, the Directive follows the proposals made in the
Green Paper adding, however, a significant and highly contro-
versial provision, the local content requirement contained in Ar-
ticle Four of the Directive.33
Before discussing the local content requirement's operative
terms and provisions, it should be noted that the various Mem-
ber States were far from unanimous in supporting the idea of
reserving a certain minimum percentage of Community airtime
for "European works." This controversy became readily appar-
ent during the early debates on the local content proposal.3 4
The French Government, 5 for example, encouraged by the
French television and film industry, including famous actors and
directors, originally proposed a sixty percent European content
requirement. 36 Smaller Member States, such as Belgium and
Denmark, initially opposed any local content requirement, pre-
sumably because the small size of their national audiences made
it difficult for television stations to recover the cost of locally-
30. Commission of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Market:
White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM (85) 310 Final
(June 1985) [hereinafter White Paper].
31. See BERMANN, supra note 22, at 432-36.
32. See White Paper, supra note 30, COM (85) 310 Final. For a more detailed
discussion of the Community's recent harmonization efforts, see BERMANN, supra note
22, at 428-36.
33. Council Directive 89/552, supra note 2, art. 4, O.J. L 298/23, at 26-27 (1989).
34. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 14, at 105-06.
35. As evidenced below, France has been the strongest and most outspoken propo-
nent for limiting the export of U.S. audiovisuals to the Community. See Rone Tempest,
France Wants to Slam Europe's Open Door to U.S. TV, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1989, pt. VI, at 1.
36. See Smith, supra note 14, at 105 (citing Tempest, supra note 35, at 1);
Presburger & Tyler, supra note 14, at 499.
[Vol. 20:90
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produced programs.3 7 Portugal, because of its low television ca-
pacity, also initially opposed the proposal, 8 as did Germany, per-
haps due to its general interest in free trade and its desire to
maintain smooth U.S. - Community relations.3 9 The United
Kingdom, for a variety of reasons, also opposed the French pro-
posal.4" Due to the strong opposition, France eventually backed
down from its original demand that Community broadcasters
devote at least sixty percent of their airtime to European pro-
gramming. In March of 1989, the Member States were finally
able to agree on a compromise, the flexibly worded Article Four,
which the European Council passed on October 3, 1989, by a
vote of ten to two, with Belgium and Denmark voting against it.4
1. Article Four: The Local Content Requirement
In its final form, Article 4(1) provides, in pertinent part,
"Member States shall ensure where practicable and by appropri-
ate means, that broadcasters reserve for European works, within
the meaning of Article 6, a majority proportion of their transmis-
sion time, excluding the time appointed to news, sports events,
games, advertising and teletext services."42 Article 4(1) further
states that the transmission of a majority of European works is to
be "achieved progressively, on the basis of suitable criteria," "hav-
ing regard to the broadcaster's informational, educational, cul-
37. See Smith, supra note 14, at 105 (citing Steven Greenhouse, Europe Reaches TV
Compromise; U.S. Officials Fear Protectionism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1989, at Al, D20).
38. See id. (citing Buddy, Can You Spare a Reel?, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 19, 1989, at
57).
39. See id. (citing William Dawkins, EC Agrees to Rules for Cross-Border Television, FIN.
TIMES, Apr. 14, 1989, at 2); see also Suzanne Schwarz, Television Without Frontiers?, 16
N.C.J. INT'l. L. & COMM. REG. 351, 353 (1991).
40. See Presburger & Tyler, supra note 14, at 499 (citing Tempest, supra note 35, at
1).
41. See Smith, supra note 14, at 105; Presburger & Tyler, supra note 14, at 499.
42. Council Directive No. 89/552, supra note 2, art. 4(1), O.J. L 298/23, at 26
(1989). As such, the local content requirement "applies only to hours of entertainment
series and feature films, the programming most commonly imported into Europe from
the United States." Smith, supra note 14, at 105; cf. Presburger & Tyler, supra note 14,
at 500 (observing that, on average, more than 70% of fiction programs shown in Com-
munity are made outside Community). News, sporting events, and games are the pro-
grams most commonly produced locally. Smith, supra note 14, at 105-06. A local con-
tent requirement covering total airtime obviously would have been less offensive to the
U.S. entertainment industry. Id. at 106.
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tural and entertainment responsibilities to its viewing public."4"
Article 4(2) provides that if broadcasters in a given Member
State are not able to air a majority of European works, the pro-
portion of European works that the broadcasters actually air
"must not be lower than the average for 1988 in the Member
State concerned." 4
4
Although the Directive does not explain the meaning of the
phrase "where practicable and by appropriate means,"45 several
Member States have interpreted the phrase to mean that the ma-
jority proportion requirement is only politically binding and not
juridically binding.46 Therefore, it is possible that a Member
State might be excused from the majority proportion require-
ment based upon a liberally interpreted finding of "impractica-
bility," stemming from, for example, the Member State's televi-
sion production capabilities.47 Additionally, given the sender
state principle established in the Directive, the phrase may func-
tion to mitigate the exclusionary effect of the local content re-
quirement on imported programming. The "sender state princi-
ple" requires the Member States to guarantee, within the frame-
work of their national laws, the freedom of their citizens to
receive television broadcasts originating in other Member
States,48 subject to certain limited exceptions involving the pro-
tection of minors.49
The Directive also does not specify whether the majority
proportion requirement applies on an individual broadcaster ba-
43. Council Directive No. 89/552, supra note 2, art. 4(1), OJ. L 298/23, at 26
(1989).
44. See id. art. 4(2), OJ. L. 298/23, at 26 (1989).
45. This obscure and somewhat cryptic language was included in order to gain
qualified majority support for the Directive. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 333, 368.
46. See MATTEO MAGGIORE, AUDIOVISUAL PRODUCTION IN THE SINGLE MARKET 34-35
(1990).
47. See, e.g., Filipek, supra note 3, at 368 (stating that "flexible administration" of
Directive might be grounded in this qualifying language ["impracticability"], and sug-
gesting that qualifying language might be liberally interpreted to allow, e.g., pay-TV
channel to air majority of non-European programming on ground that majority pro-
portion requirement was "not practicable" because majority of popular entertainment
films are made in the United States). As discussed below, however, Member States and
Community authorities generally have not adopted such a liberal interpretation of the
potentially flexible language.
48. Council Directive No. 89/552, supra note 2, art. 2(2), OJ. L 298/23, at 26
(1989).
49. See id. art. 22, O.J. L 298/23, at 29 (1989).
[Vol. 20:90
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sis or on an overall nationwide basis.50 Notwithstanding the mer-
its of an overall nationwide basis," the Commission has stated
that the local content requirement should be applied on an indi-
vidual broadcaster basis and "[w]here an organization has sev-
eral different channels, these will be considered individually. 5 2
This is "the most stringent and potentially trade-restrictive inter-
pretation" of the local content requirement.55
As mentioned above, the overarching goal of the Directive is
the creation of a common Community market in television
broadcasting which allows television broadcasting, as that term is
defined in the Directive, 54 to move freely across national bor-
50. Some Member States require their national broadcasters to satisfy the
mandatory European works proportion during specified time slots. France, for exam-
ple, requires that its broadcasters air at least sixty percent European works during "the
most commercially desirable time slot - prime time. See Smith, supra note 14, at 107.
51. The U.S. Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") has adopted such an
approach in several recent opinions. For example, in In re Children's Television Program-
ming and Advertising Practices, 96 F.C.C.2d 634, 647 (1984), the FCC stated, "the ade-
quacy of the programming to which children have access must be based on a considera-
tion of the whole of the video distribution system," and that this system must be viewed
"broadly and on an overall national basis." More recent examples of such an approach
are discussed in DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG ET AL., REGULATION OF THE ELECTRONIC MASS
MEDIA: LAW AND POLICY FOR RADIO, TELEVISION, CABLE AND THE NEW VIDEO TECHNOLO-
GIES 489 (1991) (discussing e.g., FCC's sua sponte consideration of marketwide ap-
proach with regard to coverage of controversial issues). See generally Glen 0. Robinson,
TheFCC and the First Amendment, 63 MINN. L. REV. 67 (1987) (arguing that constitutional
considerations require FCC to consider all sources presenting views to public). Cf. In re
The Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, 98 F.C.C. 2d 1076, 1087 (1984)
(arguing that even though individual stations are not presenting required amounts in
all program categories, overall performance is sufficient).
52. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 332 (quoting Reply to Questions Put Forward by
the American Delegation on the Television Without Frontiers Directive and on the
Convention of the Council of Europe, at 4 (undated) (on file at the Directorate Gen-
eral for External Relations of the EC Commission) [hereinafter Reply]. It should be
noted, however, that the Directive does not empower the Commission to "adopt bind-
ing acts relating to the interpretation of the Directive." Reply, supra, at 2.
53. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 332-33.
54. The Preamble states that "this Directive, [is] confined specifically to television
broadcasting rules .... " Council Directive No. 89/552, supra note 2, OJ. L. 298/23, at
23. Television broadcasting, however, is defined in Article 1 (a) to include "the initial
transmission by wire or over the air, including that by satellite, in unencoded or en-
coded form, of television programmes intended for reception by the public." Id. art
1 (a), OJ. L. 298/23, at 25. Thus, the Directive, by its terms, applies not only to tradi-
tional broadcast media such as VHF and UHF transmissions, but also to cable television,
direct broadcasting by satellite, and other means of transmission. Council Directive No.
89/552, supra note 2, OJ. L. 298/23, at 25 (1989). The Directive, however, does not
impact other broadcast media, such as radio. See Hoffman-Riem, supra note 21, at 607.
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ders.55 To achieve this goal, the Directive establishes the follow-
ing framework. First, it imposes an obligation on Member States
to enact national legislation that meets or exceeds the minimum
standards set out in the Directive (e.g., local content require-
ments, advertising restrictions, protection of minors, etc.).56
Thus, a Member State is required to ensure that all broadcasters
within its jurisdiction comply with its harmonized national
laws.57 Second, Member States must comply with the sender
state principle, thus providing their citizens with the freedom to
receive television broadcasts originating in other Member
States,58 subject to certain limited exceptions involving the pro-
tection of minors. 59 The sender state principle makes it much
easier for Community broadcasters to broadcast into several
other Member States,6" and is consistent with the principles the
Court of Justice has expressed regarding the free movement of
goods.6 Thus, under the Directive, a television program created
and broadcast in accordance with the laws of one Member State
may be broadcast in any other Member State without restric-
62tion.
55. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 328.
56. See Council Directive No. 89/552, supra note 2, arts. 2-3, O.J. L 298/23, at 26
(1989). Directives, which are binding only as to their overall objectives, allow for varia-
tion among Member States' laws. See EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 189, [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 693; see also Smith, supra note 14, at 122. See generally BERMANN, supra note
22, at 74-79 (discussing various forms of legal acts taken by Community). Therefore,
Member States may impose more detailed or stricter national rules for their broadcast-
ers, conceivably even requiring a one hundred percent local content requirement, pro-
vided the national laws meet the floor requirements outlined in the Directive and do
not otherwise offend Community law. See Council Directive No. 89/552, supra note 2,
art. 3, O.J. L 298/23, at 26 (1989); see also Hoffman-Riem, supra note 21, at 609; Filipek,
supra note 3, at 339; Shao, supra note 5, at 111.
57. See Council Directive No. 89/552, supra note 2, art. 3(2), O.J. L 298/23, at 26
(1989).
58. See id. art. 2(2), O.J. L 298/23, at 26 (1989).
59. See id. art. 22, OJ. L 298/23, at 29 (1989).
60. See Hoffman-Riem, supra note 21, at 607.
61. See, e.g., Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung Ffr Branntwein (Cas-
sis de Dijon), Case 120/78, [1979] E.C.R. 649, 664, 14, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 494, at 510
(stating "[t]here is ... no valid reason why, provided that they have been lawfully pro-
duced and marketed in one of the Member States, alcoholic beverages should not be
introduced into any other Member State .... ); Commission v. France (Woodworking
machines), Case 188/84, [1986] E.C.R. 419, 16 (discussing duty of mutual recognition
and reciprocity).
62. Rebecca Wallace & David Goldberg, Television Broadcasting: The Community's Re-
sponse, 26 COMMON MKT. L. REX'. 717, 719 (1989).
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2. Enforcing Article Four
The EC Treaty empowers the Commission to enforce the
Directive.6" Furthermore, individual private parties, under
proper circumstances, may rely on a harmonization directive
even when a Member State has failed to implement the directive,
and thus may have standing to bring a cause of action.64 Article
25(1) of the Directive requires Member States to comply with
the Directive's terms by enacting appropriate national legislation
no later than October 3, 1991.65 Predictably, Member States
have enacted a wide variety of national laws and regulations
designed to satisfy the Directive's requirements.66 To ensure
Member State compliance with the Directive's terms, Article
63. Article 155 of the EC Treaty authorizes the Commission to supervise the appli-
cation of Community law and Article 169 authorizes the Commission to bring suit
before the Court of Justice if a Member State fails to comply with Community law. EC
Treaty, supra note 22, arts. 155, 169, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 682, 686. See Filipek, supra
note 3, at 334 & n.67; cf. Hoffman-Riem, supra note 21, at 607.
64. See Hoffman-Riem, supra note 21, at 607; cf. Smith, supra note 14, at 109. For a
more detailed discussion of when, and under what conditions, including the "direct
effect" requirement and the requirement that the directive contain clear, uncondi-
tional, and concrete terms, individuals may rely upon an unimplemented harmoniza-
tion directive, see BERMANN, supra note 22, at 166-92, 430-31.
65. See Council Directive No. 89/552, supra note 2, art. 25(1), O.J. L 298/23, at 30
(1989).
66. France, for example, implemented a 60% Community content requirement
for all programs broadcast during prime time, between six p.m. and eleven p.m. Smith,
supra note 14, at 107. France also has made it very clear that it takes its national Com-
munity content requirement seriously. Within a couple of months after the Directive
was passed and harmonized national laws were passed, and the French Ministry of Cul-
ture and Communication fined a station $10 million for broadcasting too many foreign
programs. See id. The French Government has further indicated that it will fine broad-
casters who violate the national Community content requirement US$10,000 for each
hour of non-Community programming aired in excess of the stated maximum. See
Filipek, supra note 3, at 362. As a result of this penalty, several contracts for U.S.-pro-
duced programming have been terminated. See Television Broadcasting and the European
Community: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Fin. of the House Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 112 (1989) (statement of Richard Frank,
President, Walt Disney Studios) (discussing cancellation of two multi-million dollar
agreements between U.S. producers and French media stations as result of content re-
quirement penalty). For a more detailed discussion of the French national laws, see
Filipek, supra note 3, at 362.
The United Kingdom responded to the Directive by enacting the 1990 Broadcast-
ing Act ("Act"), which requires U.K. broadcasters to air a "proper proportion" of Euro-
pean programming. Smith, supra note 14, at 107-08. While the Act does not define
what constitutes a "proper proportion," the guidelines issued by the regional television
licensing body define the term as meaning not less than 75% of all programming, a
percentage which has caused considerable alarm in the U.S. entertainment industry.
Id. The Act, however, only applies to British broadcasters, and may not apply to cable
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4(3) imposes a reporting requirement on Member States that
allows the Community to monitor Member State compliance.67
Under this provision, Member States are required to report to
the Commission every two years on their progress in meeting the
local content requirement and are obligated to provide "the rea-
sons, in each case, for the failure to attain the required propor-
tion and the measures adopted or envisaged in order to achieve
it."" The Commission, which is obligated to monitor and foster
compliance with the Directive,69 compiles the results of these re-
ports and, in turn, reports them to the other Member States and
the European Parliament, along with a Commission opinion, if
appropriate.70 While the binding nature of the local content
requirement is part of the ongoing dispute between the Commu-
nity and the United States, the observation of one commentator
is particularly noteworthy: "Although Article Four does not be-
stow any new powers upon the Commission, the monitoring pro-
gram ensures regular scrutiny of Member State compliance and
increases the likelihood that the European works quota will be
enforced."7'
D. The European Convention on Transfrontier Broadcasting
At the same time the Directive was moving through the
Community's legislative process, members of the Council of Eu-
rope were negotiating an essentially identical piece of regulatory
systems and satellite signals transmitted to British viewers from outside the United King-
dom. Id.
In 1991, Italy implemented a progressive content requirement. Id. at 108. It set a
minimum of 40% European content for three years, after which it increased the mini-
mum to 51%. Id.
While no Member State has expressly availed itself of the "where practicable"
clause, see supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text, according to a U.S. industry re-
port, Portugal supposedly has not been enforcing the local content requirement be-
cause it does not have sufficient local programming to fill the requirement. See Smith,
supra note 14, at 108 (citing U.S. entertainment industry report). For more informa-
tion on various Member State harmonization efforts, see Smith, supra note 14, at 107-09.
67. Council Directive No. 89/552, supra note 2, art. 4(3), O.J. L 298/23, at 27
(1989).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. In its opinion, the Commission is to consider the "progress achieved in
relation to previous years, the share of first broadcast works in the programming, the
particular circumstances of new television broadcasters and the specific situation of
countries with a low audiovisual production capacity or restricted language area." Id.
71. Filipek, supra note 3, at 335.
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text, the European Convention on Transfrontier Broadcasting
("Convention").72 The similarity between the Convention and
the Directive was the result of a conscious dovetailing effort that
resulted in close parallels between the two texts' substantive reg-
ulatory provisions."3 Indeed, many provisions use the same lan-
guage, while other provisions express the same requirements in
similar language. 4 Most important, however, both texts set
forth the same fundamental objectives for transfrontier broad-
casts, viz., the creation, harmonization, and enforcement of na-
tional legislation, including the majority European works re-
quirement,7 5 to ensure that broadcasts within a given member
nation meet certain minimum standards and to provide that
broadcasts meeting these standards may be freely broadcast to
other member nations. v6 Although this Article focuses on the
Directive, the analyses of the substantive issues surrounding the
Directive applies equally to the Convention due to the essentially
identical substantive provisions contained in the two texts.
The only substantial differences between the Convention
and the Directive relate to the respective structures of the two
institutions, the Council of Europe as compared with the Com-
munity.7 7 Because the Council of Europe is an intergovernmen-
tal organization, the Convention provides for dispute resolu-
tion.71 On the other hand, because the Community is a suprana-
tional organization, there is no need for such a provision in the
Directive. 9 Furthermore, the Convention, a multilateral agree-
ment, lacks the strong enforcement mechanisms available to the
Community. °
72. Convention, supra note 3, at 242.
73. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 335-36.
74. See id. at 336.
75. Compare Council Directive No. 89/552, supra note 2, art. 4(1), O.J. L 298/23, at
26 (1989) with Convention, supra note 3, art. 10, at 247.
76. Compare Council Directive No. 89/552, supra note 2, arts. 2, 3(2), O.J. L 298/
23, at 26 (1989) with Convention, supra note 3, art. 5, at 245; See Filipek, supra note 3,
at 328, 336.
77. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 336.
78. See Convention, supra note 3, arts. 25-26, at 255.
79. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 336.
80. Id.
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III. LEGAL CHALLENGES AND DEFENSES
A. The GA7T
1. Historical Overview
The fundamental principles behind the GATT have their
origin in the various trade arrangements that were introduced in
the 1930's, particularly the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreement,81
and the 1940's, exemplified by the Bretton Woods discussions. 82
These arrangements grew out of recognition that protectionist
"beggar-thy-neighbor" trade policies83  had substantially re-
stricted international trade, which in turn contributed to the
world economic system's collapse in the 1920's and 1930's.14
This collapse, in turn, is widely believed to have contributed to
increased military tensions which, of course, eventually led to
war.8" The resulting, albeit belated, widespread recognition of
the importance of international trade led the major commercial
nations to meet in Havana in 1946 to draft a charter for the In-
ternational Trade Organization ("ITO").86 Although the assem-
bled nations were unable to initially agree upon a charter, they
did agree upon and ultimately signed the GATT8 7 as a temporary
expression of the free trade principles that they intended to be
absorbed into the ITO upon its establishment.8 8 Although a
draft charter eventually was created, the United States decided
81. Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 316, 48 Stat. 943 (codi-
fied at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1351-54 (1994)); see WILBUR F. MONROE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE POL-
ICY IN TRANSITION 10 (1975); see asoJOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 31
(1989).
82. See, e.g., ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLO-
MACY 10 (1975).
83. The protectionist trade policies in place at the time included, inter alia, quanti-
tative trade restrictions (quotas), high tariffs, exchange rate manipulation, and other
nationally self-interested trade restrictions that caused chaos in international markets.
SeeJOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 9 (1969).
84. See Smith, supra note 14, at 111; Shao, supra note 5, at 109.
85. SeeJACKSON, supra note 83, at 9-10; see also Shao, supra note 5, at 109 (discuss-
ing thoughts of former Secretary of State Cordell Hull) (citation omitted). This brings
to mind the famous quotation by Frederic Bastait: "When goods do not cross borders,
soldiers will."
86. See Smith, supra note 14, at 111-12.
87. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
88. See HUDEC, supra note 82, at 44. As evidence of the Contracting Parties' com-
mitment to achieving the GATT's primary objective of liberalizing international trade
and commerce, the GATT signatories committed themselves to the "substantial reduc-
tion of tariffs and other barriers to trade and ... the elimination of discriminatory
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not to ratify it, and international support for the ITO quickly
waned thereafter.8 9 Nonetheless, the GATT, however procedur-
ally ill-equipped, continued to live on as the primary multilateral
instrument governing international trade.
The basic premises behind the GATT may be summarized
as follows: (1) based on the principle of comparative advantage,
liberal trade practices are beneficial to the global society in that
they facilitate the efficient use of global resources;9" (2) restric-
treatment in international commerce." GATT, supra note 87, at All, 55 U.N.T.S. 196;
Smith, supra note 14, at 111.
89. See HUDEC, supra note 82, at 53.
90. The basic economic benefits of free trade, based on the principle of compara-
tive advantage, are simply stated. Free trade allows consumers to purchase efficiently
produced, inexpensive goods locally or from around the world. Because there are no
import restrictions or similar restraints, consumers are not forced to purchase inef-
ficiently produced, expensive local goods that they might otherwise be forced to
purchase if there were import restrictions or other restraints; see, e.g., ROBERT B.
EKELUND, JR. & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, MICROECONOMIcS 465-71 (1986); see generally
DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION (1817) (outlin-
ing principles of economics and benefits of free trade). Two major arguments are com-
monly voiced regarding the perceived injurious effect of free trade.
Perhaps the most widely contended and most visible complaint is that free trade
will result in unemployment among the local, presumably inefficient, work force. See,
e.g., ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, PUBLIC CONTROLS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE §§ 6.11, 6.32
(1983). It should therefore come as no surprise that local television producers, actors,
and directors who feared for their jobs and livelihoods were among the primary sup-
porters of the Directive. Free trade advocates respond by arguing that any injury to the
inefficient local industry, including unemployment, will be short lived, and that re-
sources, including labor, will be reallocated to more efficient industries which in turn
will benefit the local economy. See, e.g., RICHARD BLACKHURST ET AL., TRADE LIBERALIZA-
TION, PROTECTIONISM AND INTERDEPENDENCE 25 (1977). Free trade advocates state that
this result is not only consistent, but also desirable under the principle of comparative
advantage. Furthermore, free trade advocates argue, often quite convincingly in light
of empirical evidence, that protecting local industry in order to protect jobs often re-
sults in an incentive for industry to remain inefficient. See id.; Smith, supra note 14, at
110-11.
The other major argument against free trade is that a nation may become so de-
pendent on imported goods that it loses its domestic capacity to produce important
goods. See BLACK1URST, supra, at 38-40. The standard response is that this concern is
only valid if the good in question is one that is "necessary" or "essential" during a time
of crisis, such as food staples, products necessary for national defense, and perhaps
general industrial inputs such as oil and steel. See id. These few exceptional products
aside and in light of the fact that the threat of major military conflict seems relatively
remote in the near future, free trade advocates argue that nations should resist protect-
ing nonessential local industries in favor of free trade practices based on comparative
advantage. See Smith, supra note 14, at 111.
While it is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss in detail the economics of
television production, it is important to note that the United States holds a large com-
petitive advantage in television programming production over many, if not all, other
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tive and protectionist national economic trade policies are harm-
ful in that they often result in instability, misunderstandings,
rifts, and conflicts in international relations which, as discussed
above, may ultimately lead to war; and (3) multilateral consensus
on trade policies is needed to prevent nations from adopting re-
strictive trade policies that are designed to thwart or have the
effect of thwarting actions taken by other nations. 1 As the con-
tinued longevity of the GATT and its important role in interna-
tional trade evidence, these principles continue to be widely
held today.92 Several specific GATT Articles embody these fun-
damental, nondiscriminatory free trade principles which the
United States claims the Directive violates.
2. Application of the GATT to the Directive
a. Overview:, The Parties' Position
While the United States was generally supportive of the
Community's efforts to eliminate restrictions on intra-Commu-
nity commerce, including those involving transfrontier broad-
casting, it was at the same time beginning to express concerns
over a "Fortress Europe." 3 With these concerns in mind, the
nations. The U.S. competitive advantage includes such things as a large domestic audi-
ence over which to defray costs, a single language, existing production facilities, and
creative production financing. See, e.g., Shao, supra note 5, at 133-36; Kessler, supra
note 17, at 565-66; Presburger & Tyler, supra note 14, at 504 (citing Marcom, Jr., Empty
Threat?, FORBES, Nov. 13, 1989, International, at 43). Due to this significant and seem-
ingly insurmountable competitive advantage and, especially, in light of the considera-
tions raised in the following paragraph, it should come as little surprise that many na-
tions are not willing to essentially surrender their television production capabilities to
the United States by adopting a pure free trade policy for television programming.
A corollary to the second argument, which is implicated in the Community's posi-
tion, is that the dependency discussed above can eventually destroy a nation's culture
and way of life. See BLACKHURST, supra, at 40. When values such as culture, heritage,
and national identity are factored into the equation, it may be that the traditional lais-
sezfaire market price mechanism fails to capture these values. See id. In response to this
market failure, governments may act to protect local industries. In adopting the Direc-
tive, the Community is acting to do just this. The Community seeks to prevent im-
ported programming from crowding out presumably more expensive and culturally de-
sirable local programming by raising artificial import restraints. "Some culturally desir-
able economic activities are economically inefficient." Smith, supra note 14, at 111.
91. SeeJACKSON, supra note 83, at 9-10; see also HUDEC, supra note 82, at 5-6.
92. SeeJACKSON, supra note 83, at 10.
93. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 324 (citing U.S. GOV'T INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON
THE EEC INTERNAL MARKET, COMPLETION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INTERNAL MAR-
KET: AN INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF CERTAIN ECONOMIC POLICY ISSUES RAISED BY ASPECTS OF
THE EC's PROGRAM (1988)) (outlining U.S. trade concerns); cf. The Shape of Europe's
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United States responded quickly to the Community's decision,
on October 3, 1989, to adopt the Directive, complete with its
majority broadcasting requirement.94 One week after the Direc-
tive's passage, Ambassador Carla Hills, the U.S. Trade Represen-
tative, issued a press release calling the Directive "an obviously
protectionist initiative," and claimed that the local content re-
quirement is "inconsistent with the Community's obligations not
to discriminate against foreign products.., under the GATr." 9
Ambassador Hills claimed that the Directive, which she called
"blatantly protectionist[,] unjustifiable, and discriminat[ory]
against U.S. and other non-[Community] film goods," was partic-
ularly onerous because it "conflicts with international efforts to
increase the free flow of information and ideas to all peoples
around the world, so that individuals can choose what they wish
to read and view and think from a wide range of sources."96
Things were starting to get ugly.
On October 23, 1989, the U.S. House of Representatives
passed a resolution by a vote of 342 to 0 denouncing the Direc-
tive as "trade restrictive and in violation of the GATT . . .,9'
The resolution called Article Four "a local content requirement
in the form of both a quota and a minimum floor."98 The reso-
lution also strongly urged "the President and the United States
Trade Representative to take all appropriate and feasible action
under its authority, including possible action under section 301
of the Trade Act of 1974,9' to protect and maintain United
States access to the Community broadcasting market."1 0
Initially, the United States responded to the Directive by for-
Trade, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 3, 1988, at 13 (acknowledging U.S. anxieties about Eu-
rope's proposed 1992 internal market); BERMANN, supra note 22, at 441-42.
94. U.S. Trade Representative Press Release No. 56 (Oct. 10, 1989) (Statement by
Ambassador Carla A. Hills) [hereinafter USTR Press Release]; See Smith, supra note 14,
at 106-07.
95. See Smith, supra note 14, at 106-07.
96. USTR Press Release, supra note 94; See Presburger & Tyler, supra note 14, at
501.
97. See 135 Cong. Rec. H7, 326-27 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1989).
98. See Presburger & Tyler, supra note 14, at 501; see also Smith, supra note 14, at
106 (describing specific challenges and allegations of Representatives).
99. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994). For an overview of section 301, see 1 RALPH H. Folt
SOM & MICHAEL W. GORDON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 531-72 (1995) (dis-
cussing foreign market access and U.S. Section 301 proceedings and procedures).
100. See 135 Cong. Rec. H7, supra note 97, at 327; see also Smith, supra note 14, at
1996]
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mally challenging the local content requirement before the rul-
ing council of the GATT. 101 The U.S. complaint alleged that the
local content requirement violates: (1) the most favored nation
("MFN") provision in GATT Article I; (2) the National Treat-
ment requirement in GATT Article III; and (3) the Ban on
Quantitative Restrictions provided in GATT Article XI. Follow-
ing the dispute resolution procedure then in place in Article
XXII of the GATT, the United States sought bilateral consulta-
tions with the Community,1 2 which the Community initially re-
fused to engage in, claiming, inter alia, that television program-
ming was a service rather than a good, and, thus, it was not cov-
ered under the GATT. 113 Furthermore, the Community claimed
that the GATT was not the proper forum to resolve the dispute,
and that, in any event, any action by the United States should
await the outcome of the negotiations over services taking place
in the Uruguay Round.10 4 Despite protracted negotiations on
the matter during the Uruguay Round, the Community and
United States were unable to resolve the issue. 105
In time, however, the Community agreed to engage in bilat-
eral discussions with the United States and to respond to ques-
tions from the United States regarding implementation of the
Directive. 0 6 In these discussions, the Community took the posi-
tion that the Directive is fully compatible with international trad-
ing rules and the GATT. 107 The Community contended, inter
alia, that: (1) television programming is a service, and, thus, is
not covered under the GATT; (2) the local content requirement
is not legally binding; (3) television programming falls within
101. See US Requests Consultations on EC TV Broadcast Directive, 66 GATT Focus 3
(Nov. 1989) [hereinafter U.S. Requests]; see also Presburger & Tyler, supra note 14, at
506. The Convention also was challenged as an external barrier to U.S. television pro-
gramming exporters. See U.S. Requests, supra, at 3; see generally U.S. INr'L TRADE
COMM'N, 1992: THE EFFECTS OF GREATER ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WITHIN THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITY ON THE UNITED STATES: FIRST FOLLOW-UP REPORT 6-114 (1990) [here-
inafter USITC REPORT] (recognizing formal U.S. challenge to the Directive under
GATT in October 1989).
102. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 345-46. A month earlier, the United States re-
quested consultations under the same Article with regard to the Television Convention.
Id.
103. See, e.g., U.S. Requests, supra note 101, at 3.
104. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 345.
105. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text; see also Shao, supra note 5, at 106.
106. See Reply, supra note 52.
107. Presburger & Tyler, supra note 14, at 507.
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the existing "Cinema Exception" in the GATT or, alternatively,
falls within the ambit of other provisions in the GATT, such as
the Public Morals Clause or the National Security Exception,
which afford importing countries an exception from their regu-
lar GATT obligations; and (4) that the local content require-
ment is justified under a general "culture exception" implicit in
the GATT.
Predictably,"°8 the consultation between the Community
and United States failed to settle the dispute.10 9 Thereafter, the
United States, with an endorsement from the House of Repre-
sentatives,1 0 threatened to impose sanctions against the Com-
munity under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.111 In 1991
and again in 1994, the United States placed the Community on
the "watch list" for potential action under section 301. To date,
however, the United States has not begun formal adversarial pro-
ceedings against the Community. The U.S. complaint, which
has been dormant since the bilateral consultation, may, however,
be reactivated at any time, at which point the United States may
request the formation of a World Trade Organization ("WTO")
panel to resolve the dispute.1 ' Alternatively, the GATT allows
the United States or the Community to request a second consul-
tation to help resolve the dispute. 1 To date, no further formal
actions have been initiated, though the parties apparently are
still informally negotiating.
108. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 338; see also supra note 5 and accompanying text
(addressing antagonism between United States and Community regarding Directive).
109. See Smith, supra note 14, at 107.
110. See H.R. Res. 257, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (denouncing Directive as vio-
lating GATT provisions and urging President and U.S. Trade Representative to take
action).
111. Kessler, supra note 17, at 572.
112. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 346; Kessler, supra note 17, at 586-87. During the
Uruguay Round, the Contracting Parties agreed to a new, strengthened dispute resolu-
tion procedure that provides for binding WTO panel decisions and eliminates the abil-
ity of a party to "block" the implementation of a panel decision it does not agree with.
For a more detailed discussion on the new dispute resolution mechanism, see ANDRAS
LOWENFELD ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS 308-19 (Supp. Spring
1996).
113. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 346 (stating United States may reactivate at any
time complaint and request formulation of dispute panel).
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b. Specific Arguments
i. The U.S. Complaint
(A). MFN Treatment
The first substantive claim the United States makes under
the GATT is that the local content requirement violates the MFN
provision contained in Article I. Article I(1), in pertinent part,
provides:
[W] ith respect to all rules and formalities in connection with
importation and exportation... any advantage, favour, privi-
lege or immunity granted by any [Contracting Party] to any
product originating in or destined for any other country shall
be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like
product originating in or destined for the territories of all
other [Contracting Parties]. 14
"The equal treatment requirement applies to 'customs duties
and charges of any kind,' 'all rules and formalities in connection
with importation or exportation,' and 'all matters referred to in
paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III,' [i.e., internal taxation and
regulation].""' Simply stated, under the MFN provision any
Contracting Party that grants an advantage to any other country
must grant multilaterally that same advantage to all other Con-
tracting Parties. Thus, for example, if a Contracting Party
reduces its tariff rates for one country, even if the reduction is
the result of bilateral negotiations, the agreed-upon reduction
must be extended to all Contracting Parties. 116
It is important to note that there are certain exceptions to
MFN treatment provided in the GATT. With regard to the in-
stant matter, the most significant exception is Article XXIV,t" 7
which sets forth special provisions for customs unions, such as
the Community,1 8 and free trade areas."1 9 While Article XXIV
114. GATr, supra note 87, art. I(1), 55 U.N.T.S. 196.
115. Filipek, supra note 3, at 346-47 (citation omitted).
116. See Shao, supra note 5, at 110; Filipek, supra note 3, at 346-47.
117. See GATT, supra note 87, art. XXIV, 55 U.N.T.S. 268.
118. Although the GATT had not formally recognized the Community as a cus-
toms union prior to the Uruguay Round, the Community, prior to that time, had
largely been treated as a de facto customs union under Article XXIV. See Filipek, supra
note 3, at 347 (citing Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The EEC as a GATT Member -Legal Con-
flicts Between GATT Law and European Community Law, reprinted in 4 STUD. IN TRANSNAT'L
L., at 32-37 (1986)). The Community itself is a signatory of the WTO and, thus, is
covered under Article XXIV.
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does not explicitly allow Contracting Parties to suspend their
MFN obligations, "it does so implicitly by permitting the elimina-
tion of 'duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce'
among the members of a customs union or a free trade area."120
With regard to customs unions, the GATT specifically allows the
uniform assertion of the "same duties and other regulations of
commerce" in trade with third parties, for example, a common
external policy.121 As such, the GATT allows Member States to
eliminate "restrictive regulations of commerce" among them-
selves, but at the same time allows the Community and individ-
ual Member States to maintain greater common external restric-
tions against imported goods.1 22
In light of Article XXIV's special allowances for customs un-
ions, the U.S. MFN claim focuses on the discriminatory prefer-
ence the Directive gives to "European works," which includes all
European works, including those produced in European na-
tions, which are not Member States of the Community." 3 Bas-
ing its argument on this definition, the United States contends
that the Directive, on its face, discriminates against non-Euro-
pean programming in that it restricts the quantity of program-
ming produced by non-European nations that may be aired in
the Community without similarly restricting the quantity of Eu-
ropean programming that may be aired.1
2 4
(B) National Treatment
The second argument the United States makes under the
GATT is that the Directive's local content requirement violates
the National Treatment requirement in Article III. Article 111 (1)
provides that Contracting Parties' internal taxes and charges
should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to
119. See GATT, supra note 87, art. XXIV, 55 U.N.T.S. 268.
120. Filipek, supra note 3, at 347.
121. See GATT, supra note 87, art. XXIV(2) (b), 55 U.N.T.S. 270; see also Filipek,
supra note 3, at 347.
122. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 353-54.
123. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (explaining term "European works");
see also Filipek, supra note 3, at 355. It should be noted that the U.S. argument loses
practical significance as additional European nations either join the Community or be-
come affiliated with it in other ways, such as by becoming members of the European
Free Trade Association ("EFTA"). See Filipek, supra note 3, at 354.
124. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 354-55.
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afford protection to domestic production. 12 5 Article 111(2) fur-
ther provides that products imported from any Contracting
Party are entitled to the same "laws, regulations and require-
ments affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution or use" as domestically produced
products. 126 Article 111(5) states that no Contracting Party shall
establish or maintain any "internal quantitative regulations relat-
ing to the mixture, processing or use of products in specified
amounts or proportions" that require, directly or indirectly,
"that any specified amount or proportion of the product [which
is the subject of the regulation] must be supplied from domestic
sources." 127
Simply stated, the National Treatment requirement
prescribes that once imported goods have passed customs and
border procedures, those goods are to be accorded the same
treatment as locally produced goods.1 2  As such, the National
Treatment requirement stipulates that if any import restrictions
take place, they shall take place at the border, by way of meas-
ures such as transparent customs duties, rather than by internal
government regulations and measures that may expressly or im-
plicitly discriminate against the sale of imported goods.1 2 9 Na-
tional Treatment can thus be readily distinguished from MFN.
MFN requires equal treatment for all imported goods, i.e., an
importing country must impose the same import restrictions on
goods imported from any Contracting Party, 130 but at the same
time it allows an importing country to protect local industry by,
for example, imposing tariffs on imported products. National
Treatment, on the other hand, requires that once imported
products have crossed the border and any tariffs or similar
charges have been paid the importing country must treat the im-
125. GATT, supra note 87, art. 111(1), 55 U.N.T.S. 204.
126. Id. art. I(2), 55 U.N.T.S. 206.
127. Id. art. 111(3), 55 U.N.T.S. 206.
128. SeeJAcKSON, supra note 83, at 273; see also BLACKHURST, supra note 90, at 24-25.
With regard to the Community, "National Treatment" extends to include "Community
Treatment," thus, Community and individual Member State laws must accord imported,
non-Community goods the same treatment as that extended to goods produced within
the Community. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 348-49.
129. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 348-49.
130. This, of course, assumes that the countries involved do not belong to a cus-
toms union or free trade area for which the GATT has special rules. See supra notes 117-
22 and accompanying text (discussing special provisions for customs unions in GATT).
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ported products as favorably as it treats its own domestically pro-
duced products.13 1
The United States contends that the local content require-
ment violates the National Treatment requirement by denying
"Community treatment"' 131 to television programming produced
outside of Europe.13 3 Specifically, the United States argues that
the Directive limits the quantity of non-European programming
that may be broadcast in the Community without similarly limit-
ing the quantity of "European works" that may be aired. For ex-
ample, the Directive provides non-European programs "less
favorable treatment" than that afforded to European programs
"in respect of ... laws, regulations, and requirements affecting
their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase .... distribution,
or use."
134
The United States claims that the Directive, by requiring sta-
tions to broadcast a majority of European works, violates the Na-
tional Treatment requirement in three separate ways. First, the
United States claims that the majority broadcasting requirement
affects the sale, offering for sale, and purchase of U.S. television
programming because European television stations that have al-
ready purchased the maximum permissible amount of non-Euro-
pean programming will not purchase more U.S. programs. 13 5
Second, the United States claims that the requirement affects
the distribution of U.S. programming because U.S. program-
ming cannot be as widely or easily distributed as European pro-
grams due to the limit on non-European programming. 36
Lastly, the United States contends that the requirement affects
the use of U.S. programming because Community broadcasters
will not be able to use U.S. programming as often as European
programming. 3 7
In its defense against the various U.S. contentions, the Com-
munity has argued that the U.S. entertainment industry has not
131. SeeJACKSON, supra note 83, at 273; EDMOND MCGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
REGULATION: GATT, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 242, 246 (2d
ed. 1986).
132. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 348-49.
133. Id.
134. See GATT, supra note 87, art. 111(2), 55 U.N.T.S. 206; see also Smith, supra note
14, at 127-29.
135. See Smith, supra note 14, at 127-29.
136. See id.
137. See id.
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demonstrated that the majority broadcasting requirement has in
fact had any adverse effect on imports of U.S. programming be-
cause U.S. imports account for twenty-eight percent of all televi-
sion programming shown in the Community.138 Additionally,
the Community has argued that the total amount of U.S. pro-
gramming sold to the Community is not likely to decrease due to
the growing number of stations and demand for programming
in the Community.1 39
The Community's argument is questionable at best, both as
a legal proposition such as, if no evidence of actual injury to U.S.
audiovisual exports can be shown, there is no actionable viola-
tion of Article III, and as an interpretation of what has actually
transpired in the form of whether there has been actual injury to
U.S. audiovisual exports. The United States contends that: (1)
evidence of actual harm is not necessary; and (2) even if it is,
evidence of such injury is readily apparent.
The United States gathers support for the first of these con-
tentions from prior GATT panel decisions. In 1958, the United
Kingdom challenged an Italian regulation requiring banks to
make favorable loans to farmers purchasing Italian-made trac-
tors. 4 ' The United Kingdom alleged that the regulation vio-
lated the GATT's National Treatment requirement because it
discriminated against the sale of foreign-made tractors. The
GATT panel agreed with the United Kingdom, finding that the
Italian policy unfairly and discriminatorily encouraged
purchases of Italian tractors while discouraging purchases of for-
eign tractors. The panel's decision is noteworthy because it
demonstrates that GATT panels may view the proper function of
the National Treatment requirement broadly with regard to
trade in goods; the regulation involved in the Italian tractor fi-
nancing case was related directly to banking services, yet the
panel found a violation of the National Treatment requirement
based on the potential discriminatory effect of the banking regu-
138. See id. at 128-29; Presburger & Tyler, supra note 14, at 503.
139. See Smith, supra note 14, at 100-01, 128-29; Kessler, supra note 17, at 564
(stating "[t] he number of European television stations has exploded in the past decade
as barriers to private ownership have been lowered throughout the [Community]").
140. Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery, GATT Doc.
L/833 (Oct. 23, 1958).
141. Id.; see Smith, supra note 14, at 115.
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lation on foreign tractor purchases. 142
The United States also may point to a 1979 GATT panel de-
cision. 14  The issue in this case involved a Community regula-
tion that, on its face, discriminated against animal feed imports
from non-Community nations.1 4 The United States challenged
the regulation under Article III. The Community responded to
the U.S. challenge by arguing that there had been no adverse
effect on U.S. animal feed exports because U.S. exports had not
declined after the Community implemented the regulation.
The GATT panel rejected the Community's proffered defense,
stating that since the regulation was discriminatory on its face,
the United States did not need to establish that an adverse effect
had actually occurred. 45 The 1979 panel decision, therefore,
appears to seriously undermine the Community's current, prof-
fered defense to Article 111.146
In support of its second contention, the United States
should have little difficulty documenting actual injury to U.S. au-
diovisual exports. The most obvious starting point is to look at
those enforcement actions that have already been brought.
France, for example, fined a station US$10 million for violating
France's national broadcast proportion requirement. 147 Fur-
thermore, France has established a policy of fining non-compli-
ant stations US$10,000 for each hour of non-European program-
ming aired in excess of France's national broadcast proportion
requirement, a policy that led two French media providers to
cancel multi-million dollar deals with a U.S. audiovisual ex-
142. See id. at 115, 127-29.
143. See EEC-Measures on Animal Feed Proteins, GATT Doc. L/4599 (Mar. 14,
1979).
144. Council Regulation No. 563/73, O.J. L 67/18 (1976).
145. Id.; See McGovERN, supra note 131, at 247.
146. Although the precendential value of prior GATT panel decisions was not en-
tirely clear prior to the Uruguay Round, see PIERRE PESCATORE ET AL., HANDBOOK OF
GATT DISPUTE SETrLEMENT 62 (1993), it now appears that WTO panels will be guided
by prior GATT panel decisions. In this regard, Article XVI(1) of the Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization provides, "[e]xcept as otherwise pro-
vided under this Agreement or the Multilateral Trade Agreements, the WTO shall be
guided by the decisions, procedures and customary practices followed by the Con-
tracting Parties to GATT 1947 and the bodies established in the framework of GATT
1947." Multilateral Trade Negotiations, The Uruguay Round, Trade Negotiations Com-
mittee, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Marrakesh, Dec. 15, 1993 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]; see
LOWENFELD, supra note 112, at 271.
147. The station eventually failed. See supra note 66.
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porter.148 Additionally, while the United States may only provide
twenty-eight percent of total Community programming, 149 it pro-
vides well in excess of fifty percent for certain types of program-
ming, such as fiction programming for which it provides seventy
percent. 10 Furthermore, the Directive may have a significant
impact on certain thematic channels, e.g., a channel devoted to
Westerns. 5 ' The Commission's recent legal action against a
British cartoon station for broadcasting too many U.S. cartoons
provides a recent example of such potential injury to thematic
channels. 152
Additionally, the growth of new stations in the Community
should actually increase the relative demand for U.S. program-
ming. This is because newer stations typically are lower capital-
ized than existing, often government-supported, stations. Due
to the relatively low cost of U.S. programming and the relatively
high cost of local European programming, newer stations are
typically the biggest consumers of U.S. programming.'5 5 There-
fore, notwithstanding the increasing number of broadcasters
and other media providers such as satellite-system service provid-
ers, cable operators, and the like,1 4 in the Community,"' the
Directive constrains these new media providers to air and, thus,
purchase less than fifty percent U.S. programming. 156 With this
148. See supra note 66 (discussing France's community content requirement).
149. Supra note 139 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 42 (stating that entertainment series and feature films are most
commonly imported by Community).
151. See Roy Denman, Television Without Frontiers, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 1989, at
A23.
152. See E. U. Plans to Tighten TV Laws, Says Pinheiro, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, June
16, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Cumws File.
153. See Shao, supra note 5, at 133-36 (discussing economics of television program-
ming production and resulting trade flows); cf Smith, supra note 14, at 101 (noting that
foreign-produced programming is fastest growing source of European television pro-
gramming and is expected to double in next decade).
154. See Kessler, supra note 17, at 565 (discussing recent growth of various media
sources due to development and implementation of new technologies and services, in-
cluding cable television, video-on-demand, and direct satellite broadcasting).
155. See id.
156. Recall that the Directive's broad definition of "television broadcasting" in-
cludes all of these new media delivery systems. See supra note 54 (discussing Commu-
nity's broad definition of television broadcasting). In this regard, it should be noted
that the Community is currently considering ways to implement the local content re-
quirement on cable, satellite, and video-on-demand channels. See GATT and the Media,
FIN. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1993, at 17. It also bears noting that the Community is contemplat-
ing instituting a regulation that would prevent U.S. broadcasters from transmitting pro-
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increased demand for programming comes the potential for
even greater sales of U.S. programming to the various Commu-
nity media providers.1"7
In short, it appears doubtful that a complainant must pro-
vide evidence of actual injury resulting from a violation of Article
III. Furthermore, even if such a showing is necessary, the United
States should have little difficulty showing that injury actually has
occurred and is likely to continue in the future, particularly
given the GATT's low threshold for finding that government reg-
ulations affect foreign trade. 58
(C) Ban on Quantitative Restrictions
The third substantive claim raised by the United States
under the GATT is that the Directive violates Article XI's Ban on
Quantitative Restrictions. Article XI(1) provides that no restric-
tions, other than tariffs, shall be applied against imported prod-
ucts and it expressly prohibits the use of "quotas, import...
licenses or other [similar] measures." '59 The United States ar-
gues that the Directive violates the Ban on Quantitative Restric-
tions by requiring Member States to institute a defacto quota for
European works. From the U.S. perspective, the Directive,
which it considers as only nominally an internal Community
broadcasting regulation, in substance functions as an import
grams direct via satellite to European viewers without dealing with European middle-
men. See Michael Foley, Higgins Criticizes US Film Control, IRISH TIMES, Mar. 14, 1994, at
9.
157. See Smith, supra note 14, at 129; see also Presburger & Tyler, supra note 14, at
503-04 (noting potential that United States could double or triple its sales to Commu-
nity in light of expanding European demand). See generally Presburger & Tyler, supra
note 14, at 503-04.
While U.S. programming only accounts for approximately 28% of all programming
shown in the Community, it is well recognized, particularly in light of the tremendous
growth of other media, such as cable, direct broadcasting, satellite, video-on-demand,
and the like, this percentage is likely to significantly increase in the future. Indeed, the
Community has expressly recognized this likelihood, stating that, without the local con-
tent requirement, the U.S. share of the Community market could double or even triple.
See Piracy and Quotas Impede U.S. Entertainment Exporters, Bus. ITr'L, Mar. 29, 1993, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Busint File.
158. See Smith, supra note 14, at 129.
159. GATr, supra note 87, art. XI(1), 55 U.N.T.S. 224. Article XI expresses the
widely-held view that quantitative restrictions pose a much more serious anti-competi-
tive threat than tariffs, particularly with regard to the ability to discriminate against
certain imported products. SeeJAcKSON, supra note 83, at 309-10; see also LOWENFELD,
supra note 90, § 2.43 at 33-35, § 5.11 at 197-99. For an overview of the economic injury
caused by tariffs, see EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 90, at 471-77.
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quota that limits the quantity of non-European programming
that may be imported into the Community. 1 0 Since Community
broadcasters cannot air more non-European programming than
the Directive allows, the United States argues that Community
broadcasters will reduce their purchases of non-European pro-
gramming to, at best, the highest permissible limit, forty-nine
percent.1 6 1
This raises the question of what constitutes an impermissi-
ble quantitative restriction within the meaning of Article XI, and
further whether a measure that in effect functions as a de facto
quantitative restriction might be found to violate Article XI.
Black's Law Dictionary does not define the term "quantitative
restriction"; however, it defines the closely analogous term
"quota" as "a limiting number or percentage .... *" Professor
John H. Jackson, a leading expert on the GATT and interna-
tional trade, has defined a quota as "a government decree that in
any given period . . . only a specified amount (or value) of a
certain product can be imported." 6 ' The technical construct
contained in the Directive does not entirely meet either of these
definitions. The Directive does not limit how much non-Euro-
pean programming may be imported into the Community;
rather, it restricts the percentage of non-European broadcasting
that may be aired within the Community. Technically, there-
fore, the Community can argue that the local content require-
ment is not a quota, but rather an internal Community regula-
tion, subject to National Treatment under Article III."6 Such a
technical argument, however, seems contrary to the spirit of the
GATT since the undeniable functional effect of the requirement
is to restrict Community broadcasters' purchases of non-Euro-
pean programming.'6 5 As such, the United States could make a
compelling argument, looking beyond the mere surface of the
issue, that the local content requirement, in practice, has the
160. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 349.
161. See id. Recall that U.S. programming may account for well in excess of 50% of
certain types of programming. See supra note 42.
162. BLACK'S LAW DicrioNARY 1256 (6th ed. 1990).
163. JACKSON, supra note 83, at 305.
164. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 354-55.
165. See id. at 355. Certain Member States have been actively enforcing their local
content requirements. See supra notes 147-58 and accompanying text. These enforce-
ment actions further support the contention that the local content requirement, when
utilized, is the functional equivalent of a quantitative restriction.
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functional effect of a "prohibition[ ] or restriction[ ] ... made
effective through [a] quota[] ...or other measure[ ]," and,
thus, violates Article XI.1
66
ii. The Community's Defenses
Perhaps because of the strength of the U.S. arguments
under the specific GATT provisions, the Community has largely
focused its defense to the U.S. claims on policy considerations
contained both explicitly and implicitly in various sections of the
GATT, as well as under fundamental principles of international
trade, rather than addressing the merits of the U.S. claims under
each of the above GATT Articles. The Community has advanced
five primary defenses: (1) television broadcasting is a service
rather than a good, and thus is not covered by the GATT; (2) the
local content requirement is not "legally" binding, but is only a
"political" commitment; (3) the GATT's National Security Ex-
ception, Article XXI, Public Morals Clause, Article XX, or, per-
haps even, the Escape Clause, Article XIX justify the local con-
tent requirement; (4) the Directive falls within the Cinema Ex-
ception contained in Article IV of the GATT; and, lastly and
most problematically, (5) that an implicit "culture exception" ex-
ists for trade in audiovisuals and therefore the regular GATT re-
quirements do not apply to the instant dispute.1 67 Because the
Community's arguments are based on policy considerations, it is
more difficult to evaluate the Community's position than it is to
evaluate the U.S. allegations.' 6
8
(A) Goods/Service Distinction
The first threshold argument advanced by the Community
is that television programming is a service rather than a good,
and, thus, the GATT does not cover it.1 69 Unfortunately, the
GATT does not adequately define a "good" or distinguish goods
166. GATT, supra note 87, art. XI (1), 55 U.N.T.S. 224.
167. Some Community Member States, most notably France, have claimed that
U.S. opposition to the Directive must fail because the U.S. market is effectively closed
off to the rest of the world. This "unclean hands" argument, however, seems destined
to fail because the United States has no legal restrictions against the importation or
exhibition of foreign audiovisuals. See Presburger & Tyler, supra note 14, at 504.
168. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 355.
169. While the Contracting Parties agreed to extend the GATT/WTO system to
allow the General Agreement on Trade in Services [hereinafter GATS] to cover trade in
certain services during the Uruguay Round, the Contracting Parties elected to defer
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from services. 17  Thus, the Community's argument invites a dif-
ficult inquiry into what distinguishes a "good" from a "ser-
vice. "171
While obviously not binding upon a WTO panel, it bears
noting that the Community has long considered broadcasting a
service. 172 Prior Court of Justice decisions evidence this,173 and
it was specifically noted in the Green Paper. 174 The Community
also notes, with apparent irony, that the United States has previ-
ously considered television broadcasting to be a service,1 75 even
in its GATT activities.176 The Community's focus on television
broadcasting as a service, however, is a bit misleading; the U.S.
complaint involves the impact the Directive will have on the sale
of television programming, a hybrid good/service, not the ser-
vice provided by broadcasters. 77 Furthermore, as the Italian
tractor-financing decision demonstrates, discriminatory national
regulations governing services may nonetheless violate the
resolution of the present dispute until later bilateral discussions could take place. See
Shao, supra note 5, at 106.
170. See Smith, supra note 14, at 123.
171. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 356.
172. Id. at 350.
173. See, e.g., Ex parte Giuseppe Sacchi, Case 155/73, [1974] E.C.R. 409, 427
("[T]he transmission of television signals ... comes ... within the rules of the [EC]
Treaty relating to services."); Procureur du Roi v. Debauve, Case 52/79, [1980] E.C.R.
833, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 362 (ruling that cable transmission of television signals, includ-
ing advertisements, is provision of service).
174. The Green Paper states that the Community's authority to regulate Commu-
nity broadcasting is based on, inter alia, the EC Treaty's provisions on the freedom to
provide services. See Green Paper supra note 20, at 105.
175. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 350 (citing CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE
GATT NEGOTIATIONS AND U.S. TRADE POLICY 127 (1987) (discussing trade in cinema
films and television programs as topic for consideration in Uruguay Round negotiations
on services); U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1991 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON
FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 16, 22, 34 (1991) (describing broadcast restrictions as "service
barriers")).
176. Filipek, supra note 3, at 350.
177. One commentator aptly phrased this mischaracterization as follows:
The Community's argument that "broadcasting" is a "service" has an intuitive,
seemingly undeniable appeal at first blush. Television signals - the "things"
that broadcasters transmit - are intangible: unlike wheat, steel, or computer
chips, they can neither be held nor counted. However compelling this image
may be, it misses the real focus of the U.S. complaint, which is not "broadcast-
ing" but, more narrowly, imported television programming. Videotape - the
media onto which imported programming is recorded - is a tangible com-
modity. The Community's services argument clouds the picture by mis-
characterizing the subject of the dispute.
Id. at 355-56.
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GATT if they impact the importation of goods. 178 Thus, the fun-
damental threshold question is whether trade in television pro-
gramming constitutes trade of a good falling within the ambit of
the GATT. This is by no means an easy inquiry.
(I) Traditional Economists' Test
Traditionally, economists have distinguished goods from
services on three primary grounds, none of which is particularly
edifying when applied to television programming. 79 The first,
and most obvious, is whether the item in question is tangible or
intangible and, therefore, a good or service, respectively.'8 0 The
obvious difficulty with this test is the fact that television pro-
grams combine elements of both.
The value of a television program is hardly captured by the
value of the medium on which it is contained, yet a videotape,
which is essential for trade in audiovisuals to take place, is un-
doubtedly a good.1 81 A live theatrical performance is considered
a service performed for the benefit of an audience. Is such a
performance transformed into a good when it is recorded?8 2
On the other hand, does a video tape cease being a good once a
performance has been recorded on it? If one considers the re-
spective values of the individual inputs, i.e., the generally low
cost of video tape and the relatively higher costs of producing a
performance, one might conclude that television programming
is a service. However, this conclusion becomes less appealing
when the other two tests are applied.
The second test used to separate goods and services is
whether the item in question is storable. Services are usually
non-storable and typically consumed as they are produced,
178. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
179. See Smith, supra note 14, at 124; Filipek, supra note 3, at 356-57; Shao, supra
note 5, at 124-25.
180. See, e.g., NIGEL GRIMWADE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: NEW PATrERNS OF TRADE,
PRODUCTION, AND INVESTMENT 407 (1989); Michael Cohen & Thomas Morante, Elimina-
tion of Non Tariff Barriers to Trade in Services: Recommendations for Future Negotiations, 13
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 495, 498 (1981).
181. See Smith, supra note 14, at 124.
182. See id. The French representative to a 1960's GATT Working Party presented
this example. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 350. By the same token, however, it should be
noted that, "[a]lthough sporting events or public affairs are often broadcast live, most
fiction entertainment - the type of programming covered by the Directive's quota
provisions - is aired from video tapes, which are shipped (much like goods) from the
program producer to broadcasters." Id. at 856.
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whereas goods are usually storable.18 3 While television programs
are storable, is this a characteristic important enough to deter-
mine whether trade in television programming should be gov-
erned by the GATT?18 4 Should it matter if a broadcaster only
purchases the rights to broadcast a program a limited number of
times? Again, there are no clear answers.
The third traditional test deals with the method by which an
item is traded. Services usually cannot be traded over long dis-
tances and typically require the simultaneous presence of both
the producer and consumer, e.g., a haircut."8 5 Additionally,
services "usually do not involve tangible output that can easily be
counted, thus limiting a government's ability to restrict imports
by tariffs or other quotas ... ."I6 Trade in television program-
ming thus closely resembles trade in goods: it is usually sold on a
physical medium, a video tape;8 7 it is often traded across long
distances and stored for later use;' and has historically been
subject to traditional protective measures such as quotas and tar-
iffs.' 89 As such, the United States can argue that, because trade
in television programming conforms more closely to the charac-
teristics associated with trade in goods, it should be treated as a
good and, thus, should be covered under the GATT. 9 But this
argument is not wholly persuasive. The Community argues that
the real value of television programming is contained in the con-
tent of the program, not the medium in which the content is
captured or the method by which that medium is traded. 91 As
such, the Community would argue that trade in television pro-
gramming is trade in a service. Furthermore, the Community
would argue that treating trade in television programming as
trade in a service would be more consistent with the method by
which television programming is typically sold. Broadcasters typ-
183. See, e.g., JAGDISH BHAGWATI, SERVICES, IN THE URUGUAY ROUND 207, 208 (J.
Michael Finger & Andrzej Olechowski eds., 1987).
184. Cf. Smith, supra note 14, at 124 (arguing that although blank videocassette is
storable good, its value lies in recorded materials so it contains elements of both goods
and services).
185. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 356; see also Smith, supra note 14, at 124.
186. Filipek, supra note 3, at 356.
187. See Shao, supra note 5, at 124-25.
188. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 356.
189. See id. at 356-57.
190. See id.
191. See id.
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ically only acquire the right to air programming a limited
number of times, thus a sale may be more closely analogized to
the leasing of a service rather than to the outright, uncondi-
tional sale of a good.' But the Community's position is under-
mined by the close analogy between television programming and
books, magazines, newspapers, and audio recordings, all of
which have been treated as goods under the GATT. It would
appear somewhat arbitrary to draw a distinction between televi-
sion programming and books, magazines, newspapers, and au-
dio recordings, especially since, for all of the above, their rieal
value is their literary or artistic content, which happens to be
stored on an "incidental goods" media, e.g., newsprint, audio
tape, or paper. The specific provision in the GATT for trade in
cinematographic films further complicates the analogy.
In the end, the traditional tests are largely unhelpful in try-
ing to make a reasoned decision whether trade in audiovisuals is
trade in a good or trade in a service. Thus, it is necessary to look
elsewhere to try to find a more appropriate criterion to resolve
the issue.
(II) Alternative Tests
(a) The U.S. Taxation/OECD "Real Value" Test
One alternative test advanced to answer the goods/services
question is the approach used by U.S. courts in tax matters. In
such cases, U.S. courts have based their determinations on the
real value of the underlying transaction. 93 Thus, when the real
object sought by a buyer is a service, U.S. courts generally will
characterize the transaction as involving the sale of a service.' 14
Using this approach, U.S. courts have, for example, held that
magnetic tapes containing mailing lists and other intangible
knowledge should properly be considered trade in a service.' 95
192. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 356. Once a good is sold, the purchaser generally
may use that good as often as desired. See Kessler, supra note 17, at 573.
193. See Smith, supra note 14, at 124.
194. See Accountants Computer Services, Inc. v. Kosydar, 298 N.E.2d 519 (Ohio
1973); Bullock v. Statistical Tabulating Corp., 549 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. 1971).
195. See Spencer Gifts, Inc. v. Taxation Div. Director, 440 A.2d 104, 118 (N.J. Tax
Ct. 1981) (viewing magnetic tapes as "only incidental" to underlying transaction); Com-
merce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405, 408 (Tenn. 1976) (comparing value of
tangible good with overall value of transaction); cf. Washington Times-Herald, Inc. v.
District of Columbia, 213 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (deeming that printed copy of car-
toon newspaper purchased was service, not good).
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This U.S. "real value" taxation test is largely consistent with
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's
("OECD") approach. Under that approach, the characterization
of an undertaking as a service depends upon the nature of the
industry in which the undertaking is a part. 196 Under the OECD
approach, trade in television programming is trade in a service
because programming is the valued output of the entertainment
industry, a service industry.1 97
If a WTO panel were to adopt either of the above variations
of the real value test, it likely would conclude that trade in televi-
sion programming constitutes trade in a service.' Although
the adoption of some variation of the real value test might ap-
pear reasonable and desirable, both the GATT and prior GATT
panels have implicitly rejected such approaches.199 The GATT
implicitly did so when it established Article IV, the "Cinema Ex-
ception."2 0 0 Article IV was adopted at a time when the GATT
covered only trade in goods. The creation of Article IV thus
implies that the Contracting Parties considered trade in cinemat-
ographic films to be trade in goods and, thus, covered by the
GATT. Prior GATT panels also implicitly rejected the real value
test in deciding disputes involving trade in books,2 °1
magazines, 20 2 and newspapers.2 0 3 Despite the fact that the real
value of these media is the information they convey rather than
the paper on which they are printed, the panels applied the
GATT in each of these disputes, implicitly indicating that they
considered these items as goods covered by the GATT rather
than services. Therefore, it appears that if a WTO panel were to
apply the real value test, it would contradict prior, implicit,
GATT precedent.20 4
196. See Smith, supra note 14, at 125 ("The valued output of service industries is
considered a service.").
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. GATT, supra note 87, art. IV, 55 U.N.T.S. 208. Article V permits Contracting
Parties to establish national quotas to ensure that films of national origin receive a
guaranteed proportion of screen time in national movie theaters. Id.
201. See United States Manufacturing Clause, GATT Doc. L/5609 (May 15-16,
1984), reprinted in GATT BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 31st Supp., at
74 (1985).
202. See Smith, supra note 14, at 125 (citing GATT Doc. L/5359 (1982)).
203. See id.
204. See id.
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Indeed, the United States could argue that this precedent
would require, or should be considered persuasive authority for,
a WTO panel to treat television programming as a good, particu-
larly in light of Article XVI of the Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization, which states: " [e]xcept as
otherwise provided under this Agreement or the Multilateral
Trade Agreements, the WTO shall be guided by the decisions,
procedures and customary practices followed by the Contracting
Parties to GATT 1947 and the bodies established in the frame-
work of GATT 1947."125 In light of the above, it appears that the
real value test is ill-suited to resolve the issue. Therefore, it is
again necessary to look elsewhere for a meaningful method for
making a reasoned decision.
(b) The "Necessary Form of the Transaction" Test
The "necessary form of the transaction" test dictates that an
item's characterization as a good or service depends upon the
form of the property in the underlying transaction.0 6 For trade
in television programming, the sale of programming necessarily
involves the sale of a tangible good, a video tape, to the pur-
chaser2 17 Thus, under this test, television programming is a
good. One obvious criticism of this test is that it appears to be
inherently arbitrary;208 different transactions involving the same
intangible property may receive different characterizations
based on whether the transaction is captured on tape.2 °9 Yet,
despite the apparent arbitrariness of the test, it has been argued
that the necessary form test best comports with the standards
adopted by the GATT, GATT panels, Community case law, and
international customs and trade practices.210 With regard to the
GATT, it is argued that the Contracting Parties implicitly
205. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 146; see LOWENFELD, supra note 112, at 271.
206. See Smith, supra note 14, at 125.
207. See id. at 126.
208. Cf supra note 183 and accompanying text.
209. For example, if the transaction in question involves a television station's
broadcasts to a viewer's home, the transaction would be considered an intangible ser-
vice. If the transaction in question is the sale of a program by a producer to a station,
the transaction would be considered a good because the transaction could not take
place without the property being passed by the producer to the station on a physical
medium such as video tape, which is a good. See Smith, supra note 14, at 126.
210. See id. at 126-27.
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adopted such an approach in enacting the Cinema Exception2 1 1
and that GATT panels have likewise implicitly, sub silentio,
adopted such an approach by applying the GATT to disputes in-
volving trade in books, magazines, and newspapers. 2
With regard to Community case law, it is argued that the
necessary form test is consistent with prior statements by the
Court ofJustice. Although the Court of'Justice has not explicitly
decided whether trade in television programming constitutes
trade in a good or service,21 3 it has stated in dicta that "trade in
material, sound recordings, films, apparatus, and other products
used for the diffusion of television signals is subject to the rules
relating to [the] free... movement [of] goods." 214 Therefore, it
has been argued that the Court of Justice has likewise implicitly
adopted the necessary form test.21 5
It has also been claimed that international customs prac-
tices, although perhaps only marginally, support the necessary
form of the transaction test. Under contemporary international
customs practices, countries list items that are subject to national
tariffs. Services, however, are not subject to tariffs, and, thus, are
not included on national tariff schedules. 1 6 Both the Commu-
nity and the United States apply tariffs to videotapes containing
recorded programs at a rate slightly higher than the rate applied
to blank videotapes.2 7 Thus, it is argued, television programs
should be considered goods; "[f] or customs purposes, a video-
211. See GATT, supra note 87, art. IV, 55 U.N.T.S. 208. Television programming
and cinematographic films are closely analogous. Both involve filmed performances
that are recorded on a physical medium, such as a video tape, and ultimately are shown
to a mass audience. Smith, supra note 14 at 126. Based on the existence of Article IV,
the United States can argue that the GATT implicitly considers exposed cinematograph
film a good. Thus, a WTO panel should likewise consider television programming a
good. See Smith, supra note 14 at 126.
212. See supra notes 201-03 and accompanying text (discussing application of
GATT to books, magazines, and newspapers).
213. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. As discussed above, the Court of
Justice has ruled that the regulation of television broadcasting is a service, but this does
not mean that trade in television programming should not be considered trade in
goods. Cf supra note 177 and accompanying text (discussing Community's possible
mischaracterization of television broadcasting as service).
214. Giuseppe Sacchi, [1974] E.C.R. at 431. Cf supra notes 21, 174 (stating that
Community authority to regulate Community broadcasting is based on, inter alia, EC
Treaty provisions on free movement of goods).
215. See Smith, supra note 14, at 127.
216. See id. at 126.
217. See id.
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tape containing intangible intellectual property is distinct from a
blank videotape, but still considered a good and not a ser-
vice.""' Additionally, it is argued that international trade prac-
tices support application of the necessary form test. To illus-
trate, under U.S. international trade practices, the U.S. Com-
merce Department has determined that once information has
been stored on a floppy disk, the programmer's ideas are con-
verted into a good." By analogy, the United States can argue
that once a performance has been captured on film, it is a good.
In light of all of the above, it has been argued that the nec-
essary form of the transaction test best captures the approach
actually applied by the Contracting Parties and prior GATT
panels.220 Furthermore, it has been argued that the test also
comports with prior statements by the Court of Justice2 2 1 and is
consistent with both international trade2 22 and, perhaps less con-
vincingly, international customs practices.223 As such, it appears
that a WTO panel might well conclude that the necessary form
of the transaction test is the most appropriate, albeit not entirely
satisfying, approach to adopt and apply in the instant dispute.
As a result, it seems likely that a WTO panel would treat trade in
television programming as trade in a good covered by the
GATT.224
(B) Article Four Is Not Legally Binding
Martin Bangemann, the Community Vice President respon-
sible for internal market and industrial affairs, summarized the
Community's position on the binding nature of Article Four
when he stated that the requirement is "not a legal obligation,
218. See id. at 126-27.
219. See id. at 127.
220. See supra notes 201-03, 211-12 and accompanying text (discussing approaches
to classifying television broadcasting taken by Contracting Parti*es and GATT Panels).
221. See supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text (observing that Court ofJustice
implicitly applies necessary form test).
222. See supra note 219 and accompanying text (stating that international trade
practices consider information stored on disk to be good).
223, See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text (reporting that customs prac-
tice considers videotapes containing intellectual property to be goods).
224. See Smith, supra note 14, at 127 (stating "[gliven the essential function played
by the tangible carrier medium in international sales of television programs, a GATT
panel should classify television programs as goods since in most transactions the ideas
must necessarily take the form of goods in order to travel in the stream of commerce.").
1996]
130 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 20:90
it's a political commitment. 2 2 5 Both the Community and indi-
vidual Member States have expressly adopted Bangemann's posi-
tion as a defense to the U.S. complaint.226 The Community takes
the position that, while the Directive imposes a legal obligation
on Member States to pass within two years national legislation
consistent with the Directive, it only requires Member States to
do so "where practicable and by appropriate means." 227 This
conditional language, the Community maintains, allows Member
States considerable flexibility in drafting, enacting, and enforc-
ing compliant national legislation.2 2 8  The Community claims
that it further interprets the "where practicable" clause as indi-
cating that the local content requirement is only a goal, not a
legally enforceable commitment under Community law. 229
Therefore, the Community argues that the local content require-
ment is merely exhortatory in nature, not mandatory, and, thus,
does not violate the GATT. 3
Finally, the Community argues that the Directive lacks an
enforcement provision.23  Thus, the Community contends that
the United States should not be concerned that Community
broadcasters will curtail imports of U.S. programming out of fear
225. Steven Greenhouse, Europe Reaches TV Compromise; U.S. Officials Fear Protection-
ism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1989, at Al. Bangemann's statement, as reflected in the Council
minutes, is consistent with the position the German delegation advanced during negoti-
ations over the local content requirement. See MAGGIORE, supra note 46, at 35.
226. See, e.g., Presburger & Tyler, supra note 14, at 502 (discussing comments of
British Foreign SecretaryJohn King); Greenhouse, supra note 225; Filipek, supra note
3, at 352-53 (discussing Community's position) (citing USITC REPORT, supra note 101,
at 6-114).
227. See Presburger & Tyler, supra note 14, at 502 (discussing "deliberately porous"
language of Article Four, including "where practicable and by appropriate means" pro-
vision).
228. Id.
229. See Roy Denman, Television Without Frontiers, WASH. PosT, Nov. 24, 1989, at
A23; see also Filipek, supra note 3, at 352-53. The Community also points to statements
by Bangemann and others that the Community and the European entertainment indus-
try will not rigidly enforce the Directive except in "very extreme cases." See id. at 353.
As discussed above, however, it is clear that at least one Member State, France, is very
serious about enforcing its national legislation enacted pursuant to the Directive. See
supra note 66 (discussing US$10 million fine against non-compliant station eventually
leading to that station's failure). Despite its soothing words, the Community also ap-
pears quite serious about enforcing the legally binding Directive. See also supra notes
66, 147-57, 165 and accompanying text (discussing enforcement measures taken by vari-
ous Community members).
230. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 352. The GATT only prohibits legally binding
obligations that restrict international trade. Id.
231. See Denman, supra note 229, at A23.
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of an enforcement action brought under Community law.2 2
U.S. concerns, however, have not been assuaged. 23  The United
States maintains that the Directive empowers the Commission
with "the authority, the capacity, [and] the legal framework to
... create a quota that will exclude American works in favor, in a
discriminatory fashion, of European works. '23 4 Notwithstanding
the position of Germany and other Member States that the local
content requirement is only politically binding,23 5 the United
States remains concerned about the interpretation other Mem-
ber States have of the requirement.236 Furthermore, the United
States points out that the Commission, notwithstanding its prior
soothing comments, 23 v has announced "[t]he flexibility of the
wording [of the local content requirement] does not ... in any
way affect the legal nature of the obligation," and "[the] Direc-
tive shall be legally binding in its entirety upon the Member
States. 238
As discussed above, 239 Article Four of the Directive provides,
"[t]he Commission shall ensure the application of this Article
... in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. '240 Further-
more, Article 155 of the EC Treaty241 empowers the Commission
232. Filipek, supra note 3, at 352-53.
233. See, e.g., Presburger & Tyler, supra note 14, at 503; Filipek, supra note 3, at
360.
234. Television Broadcasting and the European Community: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Telecommunications and Fin. of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. 112 (1989), at 32-33 (statement ofJ. Michael Farren, Undersecretary for Inter-
national Trade, Department of Commerce).
235. See supra notes 225-33 and accompanying text (delineating view that Directive
is politically and not legally binding).
236. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 360.
237. See supra notes 225-33 and accompanying text (expressing idea that Directive
is politically and not legally binding).
238. EC Council, Declaration Au Process-Verbal du Conseil, Oct. 3, 1989, at 3 (un-
published Annex to the Directive, on file with author).
239. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text (outlining enforcement require-
ments set up by Directive).
240. Council Directive No. 89/552, supra note 2, art. 4, O.J. L 298/23, at 27
(1989). As one commentator has noted:
[D]irectives by definition are binding in nature even though they may be flexi-
ble in allowing variation among the laws of Member States. The obligatory
nature of [the Directive] is also evidenced in its third paragraph which re-
quires that "[f]rom 3 October 1991, the Member States shall provide the Com-
mission every two years with a report on the application of this Article .... "
Id. Kessler, supra note 17, at 573-74 (citing BARRY E. CARTER & PHILIP R. TRIMBLE, INTER-
NATIONAL LAw 513 (3rd ed. 1991)).
241. EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 155, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 682.
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to supervise the application of Community law and to bring suit,
pursuant to Article 169, before the Court of Justice in order to
compel Member State compliance with Community law.242 Ad-
ditionally, Member States and private parties may challenge a
Member State's laws on the ground that the laws do not comply
with a concrete2 43 Community directive .2 44 Thus, a Community
television producer or other interested party could sue a Mem-
ber State in either a national court or the Court of Justice 245 for
that Member State's failure to comply with the Directive.246 Fur-
thermore, as one commentator has noted, the Community has
recently taken actions that place the Community's claim that the
local content requirement is only "politically binding" in doubt:
The intent that this Directive be binding on the Member
States is most concretely indicated by the [Community]'s ac-
tual attempts to enforce it. In 1992 the European Commis-
sion sent "pre-litigation" letters to all twelve Member States
requesting reports on implementation and warning that defi-
ciencies in some Members' implementation had been no-
ticed. In the most recent Green Paper on Audiovisual Policy,
the [Community] also censured those Member States that
had been delinquent in implementing the Directive. In addi-
tion, the intent that the provisions of the Directive be
respected is ultimately manifested by the [Community] 's rig-
orous defense of it from attacks by the United States.2 47
242. See EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 169, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 686; see also Kess-
ler, supra note 17, at 574. While the EC Treaty endows the Community with some
discretion in enforcing compliance with the Directive, the review mandated by the Di-
rective is not discretionary; it requires the Commission to review compliance with the
Directive every two years and to report its findings to other Member States and to the
European Council. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. This mandatory report-
ing requirement implies that compliance with the local content requirement "will be
scrutinized on a regular basis, thereby providing parties dissatisfied with its operation a
mechanism for effecting change." Filipek, supra note 3, at 361; cf supra notes 63-68 and
accompanying text (discussing enforcement of Directive by Community members).
243. A directive is "concrete" if it sets forth a complete and precise legal obliga-
tion. See SACE v. Italian Ministry of Finance, Case 33/70, [1970] E.C.R. 1213; see also
supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
244. See Public Prosecutor v. Ratti, [1979] E.C.R. 1629; see also supra note 64 and
accompanying text.
245. In the final instance, the Court of Justice will resolve any issues regarding
Member State implementation of the Directive. See EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 164,
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 684 (stating "[t]he Court ofJustice shall ensure observance of law
and justice in the interpretation and application of this Treaty.").
246. Smith, supra note 14, at 109, 122.
247. Kessler, supra note 17, at 574; cf. Hoffman-Riem, supra note 21, at 610.
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As further indicia of the de facto binding nature of the Directive,
the Commission recently began legal proceedings against the
United Kingdom for allowing certain thematic channels to air
more than fifty percent non-European programming.248 One
such case was brought against a British channel dedicated to air-
ing predominantly U.S. cartoons. 249 Further evidence that the
Community is taking the enforcement of the Directive seriously
is provided in the 1994 Green Paper on Audiovisual Policy,
which proposes tightening restrictions on the broadcast of non-
European television programming.2 50
In the alternative, the United States argues that even if the
local content requirement is found not to be legally binding, the
requirement nonetheless violates the GATT because it has a dis-
criminatory effect on the import of non-European program-
ming.2 5 1 This argument is based on a 1984 GATT panel deci-
sion 2 12 holding that measures taken by a Contracting Party may
violate the National Treatment requirement 253 if they have a dis-
criminatory effect on imported products. 25 4 In the 1984 panel
decision, the panel held that a complaining party need not pro-
vide evidence of actual injury to an export industry; rather, the
complainant need only show that its product received different
treatment from that accorded to local products.255  Thus, the
United States argues that since Member States have enacted lo-
cal content requirements that local broadcasters will apparently
view as legally binding,256 discrimination is likely to be found.
The United States, therefore, maintains that the National Treat-
248. See E.U. Plans to Tighten TV Laws, Says Pinheiro, supra note 152.
249. Id.
250. EU Must Help Vital Audiovisual Industry, Commission Says, REUTER EUR. Bus.
REP., Sept. 28, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Cumws File.
251. See Smith, supra note 14, at 122-23.
252. Id. at 122 (citing Canada: Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, at
5.5, GATT Panel Report 30S/140 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 GATT Panel Decision]).
253. See supra notes 125-58 and accompanying text (outlining U.S. argument that
Directive violates National Treatment requirement of GATT).
254. See 1984 GATT Panel Decision, supra note 252, at 5.5; cf supra notes 141-46
and accompanying text.
255. See Smith, supra note 14, at 122-23 (citing 1984 GATT Panel Decision, supra
note 252, at 1 5.9). Whether or not the discrimination affected a specific transaction is
not an issue; the issue is whether the treatment was different. Cf Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art. 111(8), in Marrakesh
Agreement, supra note 146; Kessler, supra note 17, at 587.
256. See supra notes 66, 152, and 248-49 (discussing French fines and Community
legal action against British cartoon channel).
19961
134 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 20:90
ment requirement has been violated.2 57
(C) The Cinema Exception
(I) Overview
While the GATT Contracting Parties were primarily con-
cerned with establishing fundamental free trade principles in
the GATT, they nonetheless recognized that certain specific ex-
ceptions to regular GATT treatment might be desirable or neces-
sary to help smooth over some potential trouble spots between
the Contracting Parties.2 58 One such specific exception is con-
tained in Article IV of the GATT, the "Cinema Exception."25
9
The Cinema Exception expressly permits contracting parties to
establish national screen quotas to assure that a guaranteed pro-
portion of total motion picture screen time in local movie thea-
ters is dedicated to exhibiting films of national origin. 6 °
257. Smith, supra note 14, at 123. According to one commentator:
Quite apart from its concern that the Directive will provide the Commission a
legal basis for enforcing a hard, discriminatory quota, the United States also
fears that the Directive will both lead Member States to tighten existing restric-
tions on foreign programming and encourage Member States that now main-
tain no quotas to institute them. In the words of one Hollywood executive,
"[w]e have seen the future and it is France."
Filipek, supra note 3, at 362 (citation omitted).
258. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 337-38. Most of the concerns had more to do with
political and cultural identity than with economics. SeeJACKSON, supra note 83, at 293;
SMITH, supra note 9, at 26, 41-43, 175-76. Political and cultural concerns were based
upon the commonly held belief that films changed peoples' political attitudes and in-
fluenced individual behavior. GARTH S. JowETT & VICTORIA O'DONNELL, PROPAGANDA
AND PERSUASION 102 (1986); SMITH, supra note 9, at 41-42 (discussing use of propa-
ganda films during wartime and belief that Western feature films encouraged viewers to
engage in reckless behavior). As such, national governments were believed to have an
interest in screening what their citizens watched in movie theaters. FrankJ. Coppa, The
Explosion of the Eye? An Introduction to the Promise and Problems of Television, in SCREEN AND
SOCIETY: THE IMPACT OF TELEVISION UPON ASPECTS OF CONTEMPORARY CIVILIZATION ix,
xiv-xv (FrankJ. Coppa ed., 1979). Consequently, movie theaters, though primarily pri-
vately owned, were often subject to strict government regulation. Id. However, several
Contracting Parties were concerned that tariffs would not adequately protect their do-
mestic film industries from foreign competition, particularly from the United States,
and thus insisted upon the use of screen quotas to protect their respective domestic
film industries. See Shao, supra note 5, at 111; Filipek, supra note 3, at 338-39.
259. See GATT, supra note 87, art. IV, 55 U.N.T.S. 208.
260. Id.; See Shao, supra note 5, at 111; Smith, supra note 14, at 114; Kessler, supra
note 17, at 572 & n.52. The National Treatment requirement expressly states that it
does not prevent a Contracting Party from establishing or maintaining an "internal
quantitative regulation relating to exposed cinematograph films and meeting the re-
quirements of Article IV." GATT, supra note 87, art. 111(4) (b), 55 U.N.T.S. 206. See
Presburger & Tyler, supra note 14, at 507.
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The Cinema Exception further provides, "[I]f any [Con-
tracting Party] establishes or maintains internal quantitative reg-
ulations relating to exposed cinematograph films, such regula-
tions shall take the form of screen quotas ...". ." 1 The Cinema
Exception then goes on to set forth requirements that national
screen quotas must satisfy. Most importantly, it provides that a
Contracting Party may only require the exhibition of films of na-
tional origin.2 6 2  Second, Contracting Parties' screen quotas
"must be transparent and quantifiable. 2 63  Lastly, the Cinema
Exception states that "[s] creen quotas shall be subject to negoti-
ation for their limitation, liberalization, or elimination.2 64
Significantly, Article IV does not address trade in television
programming.2 65 Furthermore, a GATT panel has never de-
cided whether Article IV applies mutatis mutandis to television
programming.2 66 However, a GATT working party, largely at the
insistence of the United States, has declined to adopt a proposed
resolution that the Cinema Exception be extended to cover
trade in television programming.2 67
261. GATF, supra note 87, art. IV, 55 U.N.T.S. 208. It is important to note that this
provision prohibits Contracting Parties from utilizing other methods of discrimination
against foreign-produced works. See Honore M. Catudal, The General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade: An Article in Layman's Language, 44 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 1010, 1015
(June 26, 1961). It is also significant to note that the Cinema Exception does not set an
upper limit on screen quotas, and, thus, theoretically, a Contracting Party could set a
one hundred percent screen quota for films of national origin. See Shao, supra note 5,
at 111. The GATT does not provide an aggrieved party any avenue of redress from such
a potentially draconian screen quota, apart from the provision that screen quotas shall
be subject to future negotiations. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 339; Shao, supra note 5, at
111.
262. GATr, supra note 87, art. IV(a), 55 U.N.T.S. 208. The Article expressly pro-
hibits the granting of special preferences to the films of other Contracting Parties. Id.
art. IV(b) (stating that screen time "shall not be allocated formally or in effect among
sources of supply"); see also Filipek, supra note 3, at 338. This prohibition is consistent
with the GATT's MFN provision and Ban on Quantitative Restrictions. See Filipek, supra
note 8, at 338; see also Shao, supra note 5, at 111. The Cinema Exception, however, also
contains a grandfather clause which allows a Contracting Party to reserve for other Con-
tracting Parties that proportion of screen time provided on April 10, 1947. GATT,
supra note 87, art. IV(c), 55 U.N.T.S. 208. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 338-39.
263. Filipek, supra note 3, at 339.
264. GATT, supra note 87, art. IV(d), 55 U.N.T.S. 208.
265. See Presburger & Tyler, supra note 14, at 507; Shao, supra note 5, at 111.
266. See Smith, supra note 14, at 99.
267. See Kessler, supra note 17, at 572 n.52 (citing Application of GATT to Interna-
tional Trade in Television Programmes, GATT Doc. L/1741 (Mar. 13, 1962)).
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(II) The 1960's Working Group Negotiations
In November 1961, the United States raised the issue of the
GATT's applicability to the rising incidence of trade restrictions
on television programming. 268 Noting that the issue was not ter-
ribly pressing at the time,269 the United States requested the for-
mation of a GATT working party to examine the issue and to
recommend potential solutions to the Contracting Parties.270 In
December 1961, a working party gathered to determine whether
the GATT should apply to trade in television programming.271
Three separate positions were advanced during the working
party negotiations. Some delegations, led by France, argued that
television programming was more akin to a service than a good,
and, thus, doubted whether the GATT should apply at all. 272 A
second position that delegations of various national origins ar-
gued was that the Cinema Exception should be applied mutatis
mutandis to trade in television programming because of the close
similarity television programming has to films. 273
The third position, led by the United States, argued that tel-
evision programming is a product covered under the GATT, and
therefore national regulations restricting the use of foreign-pro-
duced programs violate the National Treatment requirement.2 74
268. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 340 (citing Application of GATT to International
Trade in Television Programmes, GAIT Doc. L/1615 (Nov. 16, 1961)).
269. Id. (citing Application of GATT to International Trade in Television
Programmes: Statement Made by the United States Representative on 21 November
1961, GAT Doc. L/1646 (Nov. 24, 1961)).
270. Id. While the United States argued that the Cinema Exception should not be
expanded to cover television programs, it nonetheless proposed a resolution that na-
tional television stations reserve "a reasonable proportion of favourable viewing time"
for foreign programs. Smith, supra note 14, at 117. The ambiguous U.S. proposal was
not adopted. See id. at 117.
271. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 340; Smith, supra note 14, at 117. The working
party was asked to examine the GATr's provisions and determine if they adequately
dealt with the problem of market access for television programs and to recommend
what action, if any, should be taken. Filipek, supra note 3, at 340 (citing Application of
GATT to International Trade in Television Programmes: Report of the Working Party,
GAT'T Doc. L/1741 (Mar. 13, 1962)). In making its recommendations, the working
party was to consider the impact of television, the necessity of domestic production, and
the desirability of promoting free trade between Contracting Parties. Smith, supra note
14, at 130.
272. See Smith, supra note 14, at 117 (citing Application of GAIT to International
Trade in Television Programmes: Report of the Working Party, GAIT Doc. L/1646
(Nov. 21, 1962), at 2); Filipek, supra note 3, at 342.
273. See Smith, supra note 14, at 117; Filipek, supra note 3, at 341-42.
274. Filipek, supra note 3, at 340-41.
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The United States argued this conclusion was necessary because
the GATT already implicitly treated cinematographic works, a
product undeniably similar to television programs, as a product
covered under the GATT, albeit as an exception to the usual Na-
tional Treatment requirement. 27 5 At the same time, however,
the United States argued that the Cinema Exception should not
be extended to cover television programming because the ex-
ception was expressly limited to cinema films, while most televi-
sion programs are recorded on video tape.2 76 Furthermore, the
United States argued that the Cinema Exception should not be
applied to television programming because, at the time, there
were typically only a few television stations in a given country,
and these stations were either controlled or regulated by na-
tional governments. At the same time, however, there were con-
siderably more commercial movie theaters in these countries
that were generally more responsive to consumer demand for
films, in the forms of commercial and popular pressure, regard-
less of a film's origin.277 Despite its insistence that the GATT
cover trade in television programming, the United States none-
theless conceded during the working group sessions that govern-
ments had understandably taken a special interest in television
because of its important role as a cultural and informational me-
dium.278
Although the working party was able to prepare a number
of draft recommendations on trade in television programming,
the working party ultimately was unable to reach a consensus
and took no final action. 79 While the United States raised the
issue again in 1962 and 1964, a second working party was not
formed, and the issue eventually was dropped, at least for the
time being.280
275. See id.
276. Id. at 341 (citation omitted); see also Shao, supra note 5, at 112. In contrast,
one commentator holds: "Article IV applies only to 'cinematograph films,' and its scope
should be expanded to television programs only by the Contracting Parties should they
choose to amend the [GAMr]." Smith, supra note 14, at 130.
277. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 341. It should also be noted, however, that many
of the theaters were, at the time, subject to some government regulation, albeit gener-
ally less than that placed over broadcasters. See id.
278. Shao, supra note 5, at 112.
279. Filipek, supra note 3, at 342; Smith, supra note 14, at 117.
280. See Smith, supra note 14, at 117; Filipek, supra note 3, at 342.
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(III) The Uruguay Round Negotiations
The Contracting Parties did not formally address applica-
tion of the Cinema Exception to trade in television program-
ming until the Uruguay Round began in 1986.211 To facilitate
negotiation on the establishment of a General Agreement on
Trade in Services ("GATS"), a Group of Negotiations on Services
("GNS") was founded.282 The GNS in turn created an Audio-
Visual Sector Working Group ("A/V Working Group") to ex-
amine trade issues in the audiovisual sector, especially those per-
taining to broadcasting and films.2 13
The GATS is comprised of legally binding provisions on
cross-border trade and investment in services, including audiovi-
sual services.284 While the Contracting Parties were ultimately
unable to agree on coverage of television programming within
the GATS agreement, it is now clear that any future multilateral
negotiations or agreements on television programming will take
place under the GATS. 28 5 However, because the Contracting
Parties were unable to resolve the issues the Directive posed
under the GATS, and they eventually agreed to defer resolution
of the dispute until later bilateral negotiations could take place,
the United States maintains that it may still act unilaterally under
its own national trade laws, namely section 301 of the Trade Act
of 1974.286 The Community, on the other hand, argues that,
notwithstanding the fact that the parties agreed to put the issue
to the side for the time being, with an eye toward future bilateral
negotiations, the United States must now follow the dispute reso-
lution procedure established during the Uruguay Round.287
The Community contends that this procedure divests the United
281. See Shao, supra note 5, at 113.
282. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 343 (citing Ministerial Declaration on the Uru-
guay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Sept. 20, 1986), reprinted in 25 I.L.M.
1623 (1986)).
283. See Shao, supra note 5, at 113; Filipek, supra note 3, at 343 (citing Trade in
Services GATT, 73 GATT Focus 10, 10-11 (1990)).
284. See President Clinton's Submission to Congress of Documents Concerning Uruguay
Round Agreement Dec. 15, 1993 (text), DAiLY REP. FOR ExEc. (BNA), at 3, 18-19 (Dec. 17,
1993).
285. See Audiovisual: Americans Back Off for the Time Being, TECH. EUROPE, Jan. 6,
1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File; The Uruguay Round: Growth for the
World, Jobs for the United States, Hearings Before the Senate Finance Committee (1994), at 18,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File.
286. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994).
287. See Kessler, supra note 17, at 586.
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States of the right to act unilaterally under its trade laws without
first attempting to resolve the dispute pursuant to the new,
strengthened WTO dispute resolution protocol.
2 s8
Although the parties were unable to resolve their differ-
ences during the Uruguay Round, two particularly noteworthy
developments took place during the negotiations. First, the
Community clarified its position on the creation of a culture ex-
ception under the GATS and, second, the United States offered
an interesting compromise that deserves special mention. The
Community's primary objective during the Uruguay Round ne-
gotiations was to convince the United States and other nations to
agree to include within the GATS either a general culture excep-
tion clause applicable to trade in "cultural industries," or a lim-
ited culture exception for trade in audiovisuals, the clause being
included in an annex to the audiovisual sector.2" 9 The Commu-
nity's proposed general culture exception would allow importing
nations to invoke a general culture exception for trade in cer-
tain, undefined cultural industries. 9 ° The limited culture ex-
ception, which the Community argued was necessary to account
for the unique impact that trade in audiovisuals has on culture,
would only allow an importing nation to impose import restric-
tions for trade in audiovisuals.29'
288. Id.
289. See Services-Audio-Video Sector Working Group, 75 GATT Focus 10 (1990) [here-
inafter Services]; Filipek, supra note 3, at 343-44; Kessler, supra note 17, at 576. In the
event that the United States or other nations adopting the U.S. position would not
agree to an overall culture exception, the Community insisted upon special treatment
or "specificity" for audiovisual trade. Special treatment or "specificity" would enable
countries to regulate imports in order to preserve their cultural identity. See EC, U.S.
Differences Remain on Audiovisuals; More Talks in GATT Needed, EC Official Says, 10 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 41, at 1777 (Oct. 20, 1993). The Community argued that such
an exception was necessary because "for many countries, the protection or promotion
of indigenous languages, history, and heritage depends heavily on national audiovisual
output." See Services, supra, at 10. The United States responded that the Community's
"specificity" proposal was impermissibly flawed due to the ambiguous nature of culture,
and further noted that "cultural identity was difficult to define given the tendency to-
ward multinational film and TV productions." Id.
290. See supra note 289. Obviously, such a broad exception, which does not mean-
ingfully delineate those items that might supposedly injure national culture, is inher-
ently open to abuse. This embodies the major U.S. argument against the proposal.
291. GATT/Audiovisual Commission Wants Specific and Limited Commitments, EURO-
PEAN REP., No. 1894, Oct. 16, 1993, at 10; Filipek, supra note 3, at 344; U.S., Japan Block
Uruguay Round Effort to Restrict Content of Audiovisual Services, 7 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA)
No. 40, at 1548 (Oct. 10, 1990). French President Francois Mitterand argued that any
agreement that did not contain a cultural exemption clause for film and television
1996]
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Although the complaint the United States initially filed fo-
cused on various alleged violations of specific GATT Articles,292
during the Uruguay Round the U.S. entertainment industry ap-
peared more interested in limiting the Community's restrictions
on programs transmitted by satellite and fiber optics, particularly
pay-per-view and video-on-demand channels, than in challenging
the local content requirement under the specific Articles of the
GATT.293  Indeed, during the negotiations, Jack Valenti, the
president of the Motion Pictures Association of America, stated
that the United States was willing to forego its objections to the
local content requirement under the GATT in exchange for un-
restricted access to pay-per-view, video-on-demand, satellite deliv-
ery, and digital and optical fiber delivery systems. 294 Addition-
ally, while the United States had strongly objected to the Mem-
ber States' practice of taxing videotape purchases and placing
levies on box-office revenues as a means of subsidizing Member
States' domestic film industries,295 it nevertheless suggested that
it might be willing to suffer the taxes and levies if U.S. artists and
producers were to receive a portion of the proceeds and was
even willing to commit to investing these proceeds back into the
European entertainment industry.296 The Community, led by
would violate Article 128 of the Maastricht Treaty. Article 128 defines the Community's
responsibility for promoting the cultures of the Member States and specifically states
that the Community should support artistic and literary creations, including audiovisu-
als. EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 128, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 661; see Mitterrand Calls for
Cultural Exemption Clause, EUROPEAN REP., No. 1888, Sept. 25, 1993, at 10.
292. See supra notes 114-66 and accompanying text.
293. See EC Offer on Audiovisual Services Will Set Stage for Clash With U.S., INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Nov. 19, 1993, at 1; Time Warner Sees Film Sector Hit by Lack of EC/US. GATT
Audiovisual Deal, AFX NEWS, Dec. 14, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws
File; Eric Reguly, Way Cleared for World Trade Deal, FIN., Dec. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Curnws File.
294. Bernard Weinraub, The World Trade Agreement: The Hollywood Reaction; Clinton
Spared Blame by Hollywood Officials, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1993, at DI.
295. See Shao, supra note 5, at 106-07, 114, 119 (citing Aircraft Subsidies, Audiovisu-
als Remain Barriers to US.-EC Accord, 10 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 48, at 2038 (Dec. 8,
1993)); Peter Passell, Economic Scene; Is France's Cultural Protection a Handy-Dandy Trade
Excuse , N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1994, at D2. These taxes and levies can be significant. For
example, in 1992, France raised $245 million through a twelve percent cinema admis-
sion tax. The proceeds were used to subsidize French movie producers. See Taking
Cultural Exception, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 25, 1993, at 16. In 1993, France raised $350
million through taxes and levies. See Chris Fuller, GATT sez Scat to H'wood, DAILY VARI-
ETY, Dec. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File.
296. See Kessler, supra note 17, at 577; see also Aircraft Subsidies, Audiovisuals Remain
Barriers to US.-EC Accord, 10 INT'L TRADE REP'. (BNA) No. 48, at 2038 (Dec. 8, 1993).
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France, rejected the proposed U.S. compromise. 97
At this point, it was apparent that the two sides were not
going to reach a compromise. The United States therefore for-
mally reverted back to its original position that the GATS should
not recognize any culture-based exception for trade in any item,
other than cinema films, including audiovisuals.2 98 The Com-
munity likewise reverted back to its original position, arguing
that, at the very least, a limited culture exception should be cre-
ated for trade in audiovisuals. Thus, by the end of the negotia-
tions, the two positions were again diametrically opposed: the
Community demanding the creation of a culture exception,
either as a general exception under the GATS or a specific ex-
ception for trade in audiovisuals, and the United States demand-
ing that the fundamental free trade principles of MFN, National
Treatment and the Ban on Quantitative Restrictions, govern
without exception trade in all items covered by the GATS, in-
cluding audiovisuals.299
(D) The Culture Exception
The most compelling and problematic argument advanced
by the Community is its contention that an exception must exist
within the GATS to account for the adverse impact that trade in
certain items may have on culture. Stated as a basic proposition,
the Community's argument is intuitively appealing; the problem
lies with its application. First, it is extremely difficult to define
what exactly constitutes culture. 30 0 Without an agreed-upon and
limited definition, the potential parameters for what constitutes
culture are poorly delineated, which in turn opens up the very
real and significant possibility of abuse by nations seeking simply
to protect domestic industries, without regard to actual culture
concerns. Second, culture often transcends national bounda-
ries."°' Third, in light of the growing transnational nature of
media, any definition of culture along national boundary lines is
297. See Shao, supra note 5, at 114. France maintained that sharing subsidies with
U.S. producers would defeat their purpose. See id.
298. See id.; Filipek, supra note 3, at 343-45.
299. See Shao, supra note 5, at 114.
300. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 344.
301. See generally Filipek, supra note 3, at 359 (illustrating multi-national nature of
culture).
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impermissibly overbroad. °2
(I) The Community's Position
The Community's primary contention during the Uruguay
Round was that a culture exception enabling nations to protect
their cultural identities should exist for trade in items that GATS
would otherwise cover."0 3 Initially, the Community proposed a
general culture exception for trade in undefined "culture indus-
tries," which would excuse a nation from not complying with
otherwise applicable GATS provisions such as MFN, National
Treatment, and the Ban on Quantitative Restrictions. This gen-
eral, culture exception proposal obviously raises a very signifi-
cant possibility of abuse; a country could claim that virtually any
imported item poses a threat to its culture. Thus, the exception
might be extended to such a point that it could turn what was
otherwise a strong basic multilateral understanding of core inter-
national free trade principles on its head."°4 In short, the obvi-
ous problem with such a general exception for trade in "cultural
industries" is where the slippery slope might end and what
boundaries determine what constitutes a "cultural item"? After a
brief debate on such concerns, the Community backed off from
its general culture exception in favor of a limited culture excep-
tion covering only trade in audiovisuals.3"5 The Community con-
tended that such a limited exception was necessary to account
for the impact trade in audiovisuals may have on culture that an
importing nation seeks to protect and preserve. 0 6 However, se-
rious questions exist regarding how the Community has sought
302. See generally Shao, supra note 5, at 141 (discussing potentially overbroad defi-
nition of culture).
303. See supra notes 284-86 and accompanying text; see also Reply, supra note 52, at
5; Presburger & Tyler, supra note 14, at 505; Greenhouse, supra note 225, at Al. Stating
the issue somewhat more dramatically, Jacques Delors, the president of the Commis-
sion, posed the rhetorical question, "[hlave we a right to exist, to perpetuate our tradi-
tions?" Id. In the same vein, France's European Affairs Minister, Edith Cresson, asked,
"[w]hat would remain of our cultural identity if audiovisual Europe consisted of Euro-
pean consumers sitting in front of theirJapanese television sets showing American pro-
grams?" SeeJeannine Johnson, In Search of... the European T.V Show, 291 EUROPE 22
(1989).
304. See Shao, supra note 5, at 115 ("Interpreted broadly .... cultural industries
could conceivably include the commercial production of anything that affects values.")
305. See USTR Press Release, supra note 94, at 2-3.
306. See id.
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to translate this intuitively appealing objective into a workable
trade mechanism.
(a) Broadcasting in Europe
Before discussing the nature of culture and the role of the
various media in creating, shaping, and legitimizing culture, a
brief word about broadcasting in Europe is necessary. Broad-
casting in Europe has evolved much differently from broadcast-
ing in the United States. In the United States, particularly over
the past several decades, commercial forces have largely driven
broadcasting and the media in general. By contrast, Europe to a
large degree still requires broadcasters to fulfill a public task ob-
ligation, essentially, an enhanced "public service" requirement
for European broadcasters."0 7 This is because in Europe there is
generally less confidence than in the United States that market
forces will adequately protect the democratic function of broad-
casting."' As Professor Hoffman-Riem explains, "the prevalent
European philosophy contends that the public interest can only
be protected through special structures of the broadcasting sys-
tem.""0 9 While certain significant changes in the media in Eu-
rope have taken place in recent years,310 in light of the tradi-
tional European concept of the proper role of broadcasting, it is
not surprising that the Community has sought to preserve na-
tional identities through use of such measures as the local con-
tent requirement contained in the Directive. In essence, the
Community has used the local content requirement as a cultural
307. As such, European broadcasters are essentially often obligated to act as public
trustees. See Hoffman-Riem, supra note 21, at 603-04 (citing EUROPE: EUROMEDIA RE-
SEARCH GROUP HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL SYSTEMS, ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND POLITICS IN
WESTERN EUROPE (HJ. Kleinsteuber et al. eds., 1986); Broadcasting and Politics in Western
Europe, 8 W. EUR. POL. (Special Issue) (R. Kuhn ed., 1985)).
308. See Hoffman-Riem, supra note 21, at 602.
309. See Id., at 603-04. As a result of this, Professor Hoffman-Riem states that there
are "calls for safeguards to ensure programming quality, diversity and impartiality of
reporting, and broadcaster independence from agencies of state and social power." Id.
at 602. He further states that in "all [Member States], however, broadcasting regula-
tions constitute a separate communications constitution which relates to the individual
political and social system." Id. at 604.
310. The sweeping nature of the Directive itself is a good example of these signifi-
cant changes. In general, the trend in Europe has been toward the adoption of a more
market-driven approach to broadcasting. Id. at 617 ("Partial harmonization through
the Television Directive has exerted a strong defacto influence towards a market model
of broadcasting.").
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safety net to help maintain Member State support for the dereg-
ulation of the various Member States' broadcasting industries.
Such a cultural safety net thus might be envisaged as a mecha-
nism, however crudely constructed, to prevent too much injury
to individual Member State or Community cultural identity or its
proxy as provided in the Directive, European programming,
while U.S. entertainment and media companies scramble to fill
the rapidly expanding demand for programming in Europe re-
sulting from deregulation.1 2
(b) The Impact of Trade in Audiovisuals on Culture
Having briefly discussed the Community's primary concerns
and the nature of broadcasting in Europe, this section focuses
on the widely-held belief that television plays an important role
in social, cultural, and political development and identity.3 13
The basic premise behind the Community's proposed culture
exception for trade in audiovisuals is the fundamental belief that
certain cultural items, such as movies, television programs,
books, and records, reflect, reinforce, and help shape a nation's
values, traditions, and identity.3"4 Social scientists generally ac-
cept the fundamental belief that the messages that mass media
convey can accelerate social change, promote viewers' adoption
of new and different attitudes, and influence viewers' behav-
ior.3"3 Furthermore, it is also commonly believed that mass me-
dia, particularly television, is a generally more important cultural
vehicle than traditional media such as books, newspapers, and
live entertainment because of mass media's unique pervasiveness
and the ability of mass media to reach and influence larger audi-
ences. 316 Thus, since the Community is concerned about the at-
titudes and behavior of its citizens, particularly with regard to
311. See Presburger & Tyler, supra note 14, at 505.
312. Johnson, supra note 303, at 22.
313. See Shao, supra note 5, at 142-45.
314. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 351 (citing EUR. CULTURAL FOUND. & EUR. INST.
FOR MEDIA, EUROPE 2000: WHAT KIND OF TELEVISION, A REPORT OF THE EUROPEAN TELE-
VISION TASK FORCE 1-8 (1988) [ hereinafter EUR. CULTURAL FOUND.]); see also Hoffman-
Riem, supra note 21, at 599; Smith, supra note 14, at 133.
315. See Smith, supra note 14, at 133 (citing CONRAD P. KorTAK, PRIME-TIME SOCI-
ETY. AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF TELEVISION AND CULTURE 10-12 (1990); NEIL
POSTMAN, AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH (1985); GEORGE COMSTOCK ET AL., TELEVISION
AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1978)).
316. See Smith, supra note 14, at 133; see also Hoffman-Riem, supra note 21, at 601.
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European integration, it follows that the Community is inter-
ested in the content of the television programs its citizens
watch.31 7
Under the traditional Western concept of basic civil rights
and civil liberties, individuals are left to freely develop opinions
and attitudes based on the paradigm of free speech, typically
conceptualized as the marketplace of ideas.31 8 The importance
of free speech in Europe is viewed largely as a means to reach
normative objectives, particularly the promotion of democ-
racy.319 Control over the mass media is therefore inextricably
tied to socio-cultural concerns.3 20 Given the role that European
governments, particularly the respective legislatures, have histor-
ically played in protecting free speech,3 2 1 the attempted balance
struck in the Directive probably appears to European countries
as a logical step forward as the Community heads toward deregu-
lation and eventual adoption of a more market-driven broadcast-
ing paradigm.Y22 In the European mind, the vital role broadcast-
ing has played in the development of informed democratic polit-
ical discourse and opinion and will likely play in the
Community's increased social integration3 23 mandates an affirm-
ative governmental guarantee that broadcasting will continue to
317. Smith, supra note 14, at 133-34.
318. See Hoffman-Riem, supra note 21, at 600 (discussing four reasons for special
protection of free speech, including: (1) individual self-fulfillment; (2) advancing
knowledge and discovering truth; (3) promoting democracy through process of self-
governing society and by checking abuses of power by public officials; and (4) function-
ing of society, especially assuming proper balance between conflict and consensus, al-
lowing social change, and fostering social integration).
For an interesting and detailed Article on how the ownership and control over
media sources distort this development, see generally Monroe E. Price, The Market for
Loyalties: Electronic Media and the Global Competition for Allegiances, 104 YALE L.J. 667
(1994) (discussing important differences between media's "market for loyalties" and
paradigmatic "marketplace of ideas").
319. Hoffman-Riem, supra note 21, at 600-01 (citing Donald P. Kommers, The Juris-
prudence of Free Speech in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, 53 S. CAL. L.
REv. 657, 673-77 (1980)).
320. Id. at 600.
321. See, e.g., id. (discussing legislatures' responsibilities of "ensuring that the pro-
cess of informing the public, of exchanging ideas, and thus of influencing the shaping
of values by mass media functions in real freedom, not prejudiced by either the state or
by private power holders.").
322. See id. at 601.
323. Broadcasting may function to enhance European social integration via its cov-
erage of socially and politically relevant events and by reporting on public opinion with
minimal state or private party influence and interference. See id. at 600-02.
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function to further the public interest.3 24 Therefore, in light of
the social impact of the media, Europe feels justified in not al-
lowing market forces, such as price and consumer taste, 25 solely
to dictate television content. It has some arrows in its quiver to
support its position.
The most obvious support for the Community's position is
the Contracting Parties' implicit recognition in Article IV of the
GATT that trade in cinematographic films should not be treated
like a regular commodity.3 26 As discussed above, the Community
has argued that this recognition should entitle the Community
to recognize a culture exception for trade in television program-
ming.3 27 The Community, however, also has more current ex-
amples of U.S. recognition that the cultural impact of audiovisu-
als may warrant special treatment from that given to more tradi-
tional articles of international trade. In the United States -
Canada Free Trade Agreement, the United States agreed to ex-
empt "cultural industries" from the agreement's liberalized
trade regime.3 28 As further evidence of this recognition, the
Community can point to U.S. laws that limit foreign ownership
of U.S. broadcasting properties. 2 9
Thus, given the pervasive influence that television plays in
the European people's lives and the U.S. recognition of the pow-
erful role that television may play in shaping public opinion and
identity, the Community would appear to have a compelling case
that some form of protection for European producers is neces-
sary to avoid the claimed risk of foreign acculturation by the
powerful U.S. entertainment industry, which maintains an im-
324. See id.
325. Smith, supra note 14, at 134.
326. See supra notes 258-99 and accompanying text; see also Filipek, supra note 3, at
352 (stating that United States recognized distinct cultural character of audiovisual sec-
tor, and particularly that United States acknowledged the importance of television "as a
cultural and informational medium" in its negotiations in early 1960's).
327. See supra notes 258-99 and accompanying text; see also Smith, supra note 14, at
134 (discussing Cinema Exception); Filipek, supra note 3, at 351-52 (discussing Cinema
Exception and OECD Code on Liberalization of Invisible Operations (Annex IV));
Presburger & Tyler, supra note 14, at 506.
328. Canada-United States Free-Trade Agreement, opened for signature Dec. 22,
1987, 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988). It should be noted, however, that the United States only
begrudgingly agreed to the exception after reserving the right to retaliate with "meas-
ures of equivalent commercial effect" in the event that Canada chooses to restrict im-
ports of U.S. cultural products. Filipek, supra note 3, at 357.
329. See Filipek, supra note 8, at 352.
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portant competitive advantage,3 3 0 and the erosion of national
identity, values, and languages.3 3 1 Having established a compel-
ling case to protect European culture, however, does not mean
that the Directive is reasonably tailored to achieve this purported
goal.
(II) What Is Culture?
What exactly is culture? Without doubt, culture is one of
the most difficult and problematic English terms to define due
to its amorphous and inherently subjective nature. 3 2 The al-
most metaphysical nature of culture often makes it difficult to
properly delineate the issues surrounding cultural integrity
claims. In the present context, perhaps the best approach to an-
alyzing the Community's position is through the use of the con-
cept of externalities borrowed from economic theory.3 3 3 Exter-
nalities occur when the market price of a good or service does
not reflect all the benefits and costs associated with its produc-
tion and consumption.3 4 Externality analysis shows that free
trade principles may fail to adequately capture and account for
important downstream effects audiovisuals may have on their fi-
nal consumers, the viewing public. 3 5
The Community's position is essentially an externality argu-
ment; while a purely economic approach to trade in commodi-
ties may be proper, or even required, under the GATT, such a
narrow-sighted approach cannot meaningfully be applied to
trade in audiovisuals since such an approach may well lead to
330. See supra note 90 (discussing competitive advantage held by U.S. entertain-
ment industry); see also EUR. CULTURAL FOUND., supra note 314, at 82.
331. Filipek, supra note 3, at 351; cf Groener v. Minister for Education, Case
C-379/87, [1989] E.C.R. 3967, 3971 & 3974, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. 401 (establishing that
requirement that Irish educators demonstrate proficiency in Irish is valid provided re-
quirement is imposed nondiscriminatorily as part of policy for promotion of natural
language).
332. See Richard Collins, The Screening ofJacques Tati: Broadcasting and Cultural Iden-
tity in the European Community, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 361, 363 (1993) (citing
RAYMOND WILLIAMS, KEYWORDS: A VOCABULARY OF CULTURE AND SOCIETY 76 (1976));
Shao, supra note 5, at 139-40.
333. See Shao, supra note 5, at 137-38.
334. See EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 90, at 546.
335. See Shao, supra note 5, at 137 ("Even those who believe on grounds of eco-
nomic theory that [audiovisuals] should be freely traded cannot deny that trade in
[audiovisuals], like trade in other goods and services, may have externalities.").
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market failure. 31 6 French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur cap-
tured this sentiment before the National Assembly in October
1993 when proclaiming, "[the French] cannot accept everything
related to the fundamental values of our tradition, our culture,
our civilization [as] being treated like ordinary traded goods."337
In essence, Prime Minister Balladur argues that "the French
[will] lose certain valuable things - say, French sensibilities -
from exposure to American [audiovisuals] that the prices of
movie tickets, television advertising, and video rentals do not
capture. '3 38 Since it is commonly believed 3 9 that culture pos-
sesses certain essential values340 that commercial forces often
threaten,341 market failure may well result, which in turn might
compel a nation to step in and artificially allocate resources ac-
cording to what it deems an optimal, non-market allocation in
order to preserve these essential values.34 Taken on its face, this
argument is intuitively appealing, but to obtain a full perspective
it is instructive to look at the actual functioning of the media.
On the surface, the entertainment market appears to be like
most markets, consisting of both buyers and sellers. Using a
Western model, driven by commercial market forces, the sellers
are typically large media companies who sell advertising air time
to companies seeking to sell their products and services to view-
ers. On a deeper level, however, it is a market for ideas, opin-
336. See id. at 137-38.
337. David R. Sands, Clash of Cultures Creates Latest Block to World Trade Pact, WASH.
TIMES, Nov. 24, 1993, at B7. Stating the case somewhat more dramatically, French Presi-
dent Francois Mitterrand contended, "[w]hat is at stake, and therefore in peril, in the
current negotiations is the right of each country to forge its imagination and to trans-
mit to future generations the representation of its own identity." Port Louis, Mitterrand
Denounces U.S. Domination at Francophone Summit, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 16, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
338. Shao, supra note 5, at 138 (citing Peter Passell, Is France's Cultural Protection a
Handy-Dandy Trade Excuse?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1994, at D2).
339. See Shao, supra note 5, at 115 (citing NICHOLAS GARNHAM, CAPITALISM AND
COMMUNICATION 154 (1990)). "Films, news and entertainment programs, and video
documentaries have already shaped societies and will continue to do so." Id. at 139
(citing CULTURE, SOCIETV AND THE MEDIA (Michael Gurevitch et al. eds., 1982)); JOHN
FisKE, TELEVISION CULTURE (1987); CONRAD PHILLIP KoTTAK, PRIME-TIME SOCIETY
(1990).
340. Certain values are necessary to distinguish one culture from the next. Conse-
quendy, these values play an integral role in a given nation's sovereignty, sense of being
and national identity.
341. For a further discussion of the impact of commercial forces, particularly ad-
vertising, and its potentially distortive effects on the media, see Price, supra note 318.
342. See Shao, supra note 5, at 137.
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ions, and, eventually, identity. Media companies, driven by ad-
vertisers and, to a lesser extent, by government which approves
licensees, 43 sell a package of images, ideas, myths, and narra-
tives to viewers that is intended to encourage viewers, often in
their capacity as consumers, to behave in a certain way.344 The
pervasiveness of Western media, coupled with its strong commer-
cial bent, has been said to result in "the propagation and exten-
sion of the American business system and its values to all corners
of the international community. 3 43 Obviously, any such expan-
sion may have political consequences. For example, European
nations have historically restricted advertising in the media that
they view excessive and adverse to the public interest.346 These
nations therefore may be opposed to the widespread viewing of
U.S. programming aimed at changing their citizens' behavior by
inducing them to, among other things, consume rather than
save or seek immediate gratification rather than toil and sacri-
fice. 47 While the underlying commercial objectives of much
U.S. programming may roughly equate with the commercial pol-
icies of certain political parties such as the Republican Party in
the United States and the Conservative Party in the United King-
dom, governments in other countries that are less receptive to a
free market philosophy may see U.S. programming as not only a
threat to national culture, but also as a challenge to the estab-
lished governments' continued hold on power.348 In this regard,
it is widely believed that Western programming, predominantly
U.S., extolling the virtues of free markets on Radio Free Europe,
343. Cf Price, supra note 318, at 671 ("Controlling which viewpoints have access to
the means of mass communication either can serve as an integrating and assimilating
influence that subtly reinforces a vision of cohesion, or can reinforce existing cultural
divisions in society.").
344. See id. at 675 ("We see assertions of national identity in the interstices of com-
mercials, in their depiction of an idealized home life, or their depiction of a certain
idea of traditional family values.").
345. HERBERT SCHILLER, MAsS COMMUNICATIONS AND AMERICAN EMPIRE 92 (1969);
see Price, supra note 318, at 697 (discussing pervasive presence of U.S. programming.
and accompanying "underlying drumbeat of advertising"). See generally Shao, supra
note 5, at 126-31 (discussing U.S. hegemony, U.S. commercialization of media, and
supposed imperialist efforts of United States to ensure access for U.S. programming to
foreign markets in order to further continuing expansion of U.S. commercial inter-
ests).
346. See Price, supra note 318, at 674-75.
347. See ERIC BARENDT, BROADCASTING LAW 188-212 (1993).
348. See Price, supra note 318, at 675 (citing MARiA N. TAISHOFF, STATE RESPONSI-
BILITY AND THE DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITE 12-13 (1987)).
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Radio Liberty, and Voice of America helped lead to the
destabilization and eventual collapse of the Soviet Union.34 9
The cross-fertilization of certain societal values and philo-
sophical beliefs that may originate in various locales further
complicates the determination of what constitutes European cul-
ture. In addition to the conceptual cross-fertilization of culture
through the regional and worldwide dissemination of ideas,
cross-fertilization may even impact certain products and institu-
tions associated with national identity.3 5 0 Given the dynamic na-
ture of ideas and values that influence national cultures, it is im-
portant to note that this phenomenon is likely to accelerate in
the future due to the enhanced rapid exchange of information
and ideas through the Internet and other institutions that have
been or will be developed as a result of rapidly changing world-
wide telecommunications and endeavors such as the informa-
tion superhighway and other information exchanges.
As a result of the dynamic nature of culture, it may well be
difficult to meaningfully distinguish European culture from
American culture. 51 Since most European cultures share a com-
mon range of values with the United States and other Western
countries, including democratic government, respect for human
rights, the rule of law, and a Judeo-Christian religious tradition,
it may somewhat convincingly be argued that there might be
only a "Western culture" rather than distinct European and
American cultures.35 2 Indeed, Great Britain may well share
greater cultural affinity with the United States than with Greece
or Portugal, and Spain may well be more culturally akin to Ar-
gentina than Germany or Sweden. 3  As one commentator has
observed, "[i]f a common culture exists in Europe, it is similar to
U.S. culture because the United States has absorbed and assimi-
349. See id. (citing U.S. STATE DEP'T, PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON U.S. GOV'T INT'L
BROADCASTING, Pub. No. 9925, at 5-6 (1991)). The role of propaganda in shaping socie-
tal attitudes and behavior is well documented. See, e.g., Shao, supra note 5, at 129 &
nn.148-51 (discussing Bureau of Psychological Warfare's assessment of use of Leftist
media by West to help shape popular opinion in Western Europe after downfall of Nazi
Germany).
350. See, e.g., Shao, supra note 5, at 140 (noting that many French wine grapes are
grown on root stalks imported from California and observing that part of Louvre was
designed by I.M. Pei, a Chinese American).
351. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 359.
352. Id.
353. Id.; Shao, supra note 5, at 140-41.
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lated many European cultural influences. ' 54
Furthermore, many cultural values, particularly those held
by members of certain social, ethnic, religious, and economic
classes and adherents to certain political philosophies, transcend
national boundaries. For example, citizens in diverse countries
may place paramount importance on imported political theories
such as Marxism or Leninism. 55 Moreover, many cultures, e.g.,
"proletarian culture," "racial culture," "youth culture," "elite cul-
ture," and "mass culture," defy delineation by way of national,
sovereign boundaries.356 The elite, for example, in almost any
given European country probably share a greater similarity of
interests, including a taste for classical music, tuxedos, fine
wines, golf, and the like, with the elite in the United States, Ja-
pan, Brazil, or Australia, than with the mass or proletarian cul-
ture in their own countries.357 The same is also true, probably
even more so, for the economically disadvantaged, members of
certain ethnic groups and racial minorities. Thus, for example,
blacks in the United Kingdom may well have more common in-
terests and identify more with blacks in the United States than
with other races in the United Kingdom.358 It is not hard to
think of additional examples for each of these cultural sub-
groups.
In short, national borders simply are not a reasonable proxy
for cultural boundaries. 59 Thus, the Directive's sweeping as-
sumption, without an articulated reason, that Member States are
more culturally akin to each other appears to be based purely on
speculation or wishful thinking, which is particularly troubling
given the significant impact the Directive may have on Europe-
ans' rights to receive the information they seek, a fundamental
freedom in almost every nation's and individual's eyes.
There is one further complicating factor: the increasing
globalization of film and television production, particularly in
the United States, the nation accused of adulterating European
354. Shao, supra note 5, at 140 (citing ELI NoAM, TELEVISION IN EUROPE 24
(1991)).
355. Id. (citing ITHIEL DE SOIA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES WITHOUT BOUNDARIES 131
(Eli M. Noam ed., 1990) and noting that even popular sports in France, such as soccer
and tennis, are imported).
356. Id. (citing ELI NOAM, TELEVISION IN EUROPE 23 (1991)).
357. Shao, supra note 5, at 140.
358. Cf id.
359. See id. at 140, 141.
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culture. 6 ° Sony, for example, owns Columbia; Seagrams, from
Canada, now controls MCA, after having purchased eighty per-
cent of MCA's stock from Matsushita; Credit Lyonnais, a state-
controlled French bank, owns MGM. 61 Foreign investors pres-
ently control over half of the largest U.S. film production com-
panies.362 Additionally, film and television production compa-
nies from many different countries increasingly co-produce films
and television programs, in addition to otherwise integrating
their operations and from all indications, this trend is likely to
continue in the future. 6 3 As a result of the trend toward inter-
national cooperation and integration, it is apparent that the
faulty criteria established in the Directive, which defines Euro-
pean productions based purely on the nationality of production
companies and the personnel involved as ipsofacto culturally de-
sirable works, does not serve as a reasonable proxy for audiovi-
sual works deserving national or Community protection. 64
(III) The Goal of European Integration
One of the more compelling strains in the Community's ar-
gument in favor of a culture exception for trade in audiovisuals
is the contention that some degree of Community control over
the media is essential to further facilitate European integration,
one of the fundamental objectives of the EC Treaty. 365 Given
that Europeans have lived in separate sovereign states, practiced
different religions, and spoken several different languages since
360. Id. at 141. As one commentator has observed:
Increasingly, multinational business entities and individuals of different na-
tionalities produce films with international markets in mind. This fact makes
determining the "national origins" of many films somewhat capricious. More
importantly, it brings into question the reasonableness of using national origin
as a proxy for culture ....
Id. at 115.
361. See id. at 141 & n.208; Matsushita Blames $531-MiUion Loss on Sale of Stake in
MCA, L.A. TIMES, May 24, 1996, at D4.
362. Shao, supra note 5, at 141.
363. See id. at 141 & nn.209-10.
364. See id. at 141.
365. The first substantive clause in the Preamble to the EC Treaty states that the
Treaty seeks "to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Eu-
rope." EC Treaty, supra note 22, pmbl., [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 587. Furthermore, with
agreement having been reached on a Treaty on European Union at Maastricht, Mem-
ber States have slowly been warming, albeit somewhat haltingly and tentatively, to the
idea of European political integration. See BERMANN, supra note 22, at 18 & 1995 Supp.
at 3-4.
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the fall of the Roman Empire, not to mention fighting major
wars against one another, the goal of European social integra-
tion will no doubt be a challenging task. 66 This difficulty is evi-
denced by the continuing struggle to delineate the parameters
and proper role of the principle of subsidiarity within the Com-
munity.367 In light of the divergent history and development of
the individual Member States, it hardly can be said that there is a
single European culture demanding Community protection.36
Nonetheless, the goal of European integration is inherently
an admirable one and one which the Community appears intent
on at least attempting to achieve by building upon the European
heritage of the various Member States.369 This intent is evi-
denced in both the Green Paper and in the legislative history of
the Directive. The Green Paper, for example, states:
Television will play an important role in developing and nur-
turing awareness of the rich variety of Europe's common cul-
tural historical heritage. The dissemination of information
across national borders can do much to help the peoples of
Europe to recognize the common destiny they share in many
areas.
370
With this integrationist goal in mind, the Community, recogniz-
366. Smith, supra note 14, at 132.
367. The principle of subsidiarity has been incorporated in Article 3(b) of the EC
Treaty, which states:
The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon
it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein.
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competencies, the Commu-
nity shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if
and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently
achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or
effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to
achieve the objectives of this Treaty.
EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 3(b), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 589. A full discussion of the
principle of subsidiary is beyond the scope of this paper. For an overview and brief
discussion of some of the issues surrounding the principle, see BERMANN, supra note 22,
at 46-47, 1995 Supp. at 11-14. See generally Joel P. Trachtman, L'Etat, C'Est Nous: Sover-
eignty, Economic Integration and Subsidiarity, 33 HFav. INT'L L.J. 459 (1992) (evaluating
use of common market to transcend state values and integrate states into common com-
munity).
368. See Smith, supra note 14, at 132.
369. See id.; Presburger & Tyler, supra note 14, at 505 (recognizing importance of
common European identity to European unification); cf supra note 365 (discussing
goal of integration in Preamble to EC Treaty).
370. Green Paper, supra note 21, COM (84) 300 Final, at 28.
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ing that it cannot influence or, at best, has only very limited in-
fluence over the content of imported U.S. programming, seeks
through the Directive to protect its media while at the same time
retaining some control over the programs its citizens view." 1 It
is in this manner that the Community, through the European
works requirement in the Directive, seeks to promote European
integration.7 2
(IV) Overbreadth of the Directive
Having established that trade in audiovisuals may not ac-
count for certain important externalities does not mean, how-
ever, that governments should regulate trade in audiovisuals un-
less, and this is the key point in the instant dispute, the govern-
ments can reasonably identify those values which are necessary
to preserve national or Community culture.3 7 3 This is where the
metaphysical nature of culture3 74 substantially undermines the
Community's proffered justification for the local content re-
quirement; the definition of European works, all of which re-
ceive preferential treatment, is not reasonably tailored to meet-
ing the proffered objective of protecting and promoting Euro-
pean culture.3 75 By defining all European works as worthy of
protection, the Directive is woefully overbroad. For example,
the Directive does not attempt to limit its protection to Euro-
pean programs that focus on European subjects or themes, nor
does it otherwise attempt to restrict its protection to those
messages and values that are reasonably related to the preserva-
tion and promotion of European heritage and identity.3 76 Thus,
the Directive is poorly tailored to protecting European culture.
Rather, by defining European works on the basis of where pro-
duction companies are located and the nationalities of the per-
sonnel involved in a given work, the Directive is undoubtedly
more effective at protecting the economic interests of the Euro-
pean entertainment industry than at protecting and furthering
European culture, a result that obviously contradicts the princi-
371. Smith, supra note 14, at 133.
372. Presburger & Tyler, supra note 14, at 505.
373. See Shao, supra note 5, at 139-40.
374. See supra notes 332-33 and accompanying text (discussing subjective nature of
culture).
375. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 357-59.
376. Id.
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pies and objectives set forth in the GATT.377 This contradictory
formulation of policy objectives and operative provisions in the
Directive led U.S. Ambassador Carla Hills to contend that the
Directive, as it would be applied, would function simply as a
smokescreen for economic protectionism. 7 s In October 1989,
Ambassador Hills, speaking on behalf of the United States,
stated:
We do not understand why the Spanish culture is more pro-
tected by a film produced in Germany by "Europeans" than
by a Spanish film of Mexican origin, or why the English cul-
ture is promoted more by a film produced in France by
"Europeans" than by a film of New Zealand origin. We do
not understand why a film about French cultural history, in
the French language, promotes French culture any less sim-
ply because it is "not of European origin." The definition of
"European works" is economic, not cultural.379
377. See id. at 358.
378. See Jay Arnold, U.S. Complains About European Limits on Imported TV Programs,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 10, 1989 (PM Cycle). Compare Hill's assessment with the com-
ments of one commentator:
The almost cynical manner in which the quota has been administered appears
to validate Washington's criticism that the European content requirement is
"nothing more than an infant industry protection for the European entertain-
ment industry," This has been particularly evident in France. For example,
since the adoption of the Directive in 1989, European entertainment firms
have been reaching across the Atlantic to conclude film deals with high-profile
Hollywood producers, directors, and actors, providing financing and "a poten-
tial way for American producers to slip their films through the French TV
quota system." There is something dishonest about a quota system putatively
designed to protect European culture that would qualify a Sylvester Stallone
film as a European work, or would certify an English language soap opera
penned by New York writers as an "original French creative work." The evolv-
ing business deals suggest that some of the Directive's supporters are less inter-
ested in preserving national identity than in transferring pieces of the en-
tertainment business from Hollywood to Paris.
Filipek, supra note 3, at 358 (citing Television Broadcasting and the European Community:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Fin. of the House Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 112 (1989), at 16 (statement ofJ. Michael Farren,
Undersecretary for Int'l Trade, U.S. Dep't of Commerce)); Joan Dupont, French TV
Moves in on the Movies: Canal Plus, TFI Aim at Ambitious International Projects, Irrr'L HER-
ALD TRIB., Mar. 15, 1991, at 8; Appell, Will This Soap Find Happiness in Europe?, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Feb. 1, 1991, at 13-14.
379. See Presburger & Tyler, supra note 14, at 505 (quoting USTR Press Release
supra note 94, at 2). U.S. Trade Ambassador Diana Lady Dougan echoed Ambassador
Hills's comments, stating, "European cultures won't be preserved by trying to restrict
exposure to non-European cultures, especially when the restrictions target the origin of
the programs and not their cultural merit or social acceptability." Id.
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(E) The Public Morals Clause
Article XX, General Exceptions, of the GATT provides, in
pertinent part:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not ap-
plied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbi-
trary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on in-
ternational trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be con-
strued to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any [Con-
tracting Party] of measures;
(a) necessary to protect public morals; or
(f) imposed for the protection of national treasures of
artistic, historic or archaeological value .... 380
Article XX thus provides Contracting Parties with the ability to
legitimately restrict, for example, the import of pornographic
films, if they deem the restriction necessary for the moral protec-
tion of their citizens.381 To date, however, the Public Morals
Clause has never been applied to something as broad as the im-
port of all audiovisuals. Intuitively, there appears to be a good
reason for this; as Article XX states, any measures taken pursu-
ant to that Article must not constitute "a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade."38 2 As demonstrated above, the Directive, due to its defi-
nition of what constitutes a work worthy of protection, is unac-
ceptably overbroad and its criterial methodology is inherently ar-
bitrary, which results in unjustifiable discrimination against non-
European audiovisual exporters. Furthermore, because Article
XX does not permit restrictions against countries where similar
conditions prevail,38 3 one commentator has stated that, because
"societies on both sides of the Atlantic generally share the condi-
tions of developed democracies, a GATT panel of impartial ex-
perts should rule that European moral standards are not so dis-
tinct from American standards as to be threatened by U.S. televi-
380. GATr, supra note 87, art. XX, 55 U.N.T.S. 262.
381. See Shao, supra note 5, at 148; cf Regina v. Henn & Darby, Case 34/79,
[1979] E.C.R. 3795 (arguing that socio-cultural concerns may qualify as imperative state
interests under Cassis de Dijon exception).
382. GATr, supra note 87, art. XX, 55 U.N.T.S. 262.
383. Id.; seeJAcsoN, supra note 83, at 743.
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sion programs. " s4
Moreover, even assuming that certain European television
actors, directors, or institutions could be considered "national
treasures" worthy of protection, the Directive is not reasonably
tailored to protect these entities because it does not base its pro-
tection on the involvement of such actors, directors, or institu-
tions in a given work."8 5 Rather, the Directive protects all pro-
grams European companies produce, irrespective of whether
amateurs or legendary figures directed, filmed, or acted in
them. 8 6 Consequently, any argument by the Community that
certain European television actors, directors, or institutions are
"national treasures" that must be preserved and, therefore, de-
serve protection by the Directive should fail due to the Direc-
tive's failure to specify protection for these particular entities."8 7
(F) The National Security Exception
Article XXI, Security Exceptions, of the GATT provides,
"[n]othing in this Agreement shall be construed... to prevent
any [Contracting Party] from taking any action which it consid-
ers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests
... 388 While this exception has been used to suspend, the
Community's obligations under the GATT to Argentina during
the Falklands/Malvinas War and the U.S. reduction of sugar
quotas on Sandinista-ruled Nicaragua, it generally has been nar-
rowly interpreted to prevent efforts by Contracting Parties to ex-
pand the exemption into tangential areas effecting national se-
curity.38 9 Thus, for example, Sweden decided against pursuing a
measure it had instituted with regard to the domestic produc-
tion of footwear that it had claimed was necessary for national
security purposes.3 90 Taking a common-sense approach to this
limited exception for measures directly related to national secur-
ity concerns, an arbiter should "look behind a country's pretext
to determine a measure's true purpose.13 9 ' From this perspec-
384. Smith, supra note 14, at 131.
385. See id.
386. Id. at 131-32.
387. See id.
388. GATI', supra note 87, art. XXI, 55 U.N.T.S. 266.
389. See Smith, supra note 14, at 131.
390. See id.
391. Id.
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tive, and in light of the absence of any claimed meritorious na-
tional security purpose behind the Directive, 92 it is highly
doubtful that the Community could successfully justify the Direc-
tive under the National Security Exception.
(G) The Escape Clause - Safeguard Measures
Article XIX, Emergency Action on Imports of Particular
Products, of the GATT contains the so-called "Escape Clause"
which, under certain conditions, allows Contracting Parties to
avoid otherwise applicable GATT Articles.3 9' The Escape Clause
was an area of particular concern during the Uruguay Round
due to alleged abuses of its provisions. 94 As a result of these
alleged abuses, the Contracting Parties agreed to a new, im-
proved Agreement on Safeguards. 395 Article Two of the new
Safeguards Agreement provides:
A Member may apply a safeguard measure to a product only
if the Member has determined, pursuant to the provisions set
out below, that such product is being imported into its terri-
tory in such increased quantities, absolute or relative to do-
mestic production, and under such conditions as to cause or
threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry that
produces like or directly competitive products. 39 6
Article Five of the Safeguards Agreement states that in-
creased tariffs or quotas are the only acceptable safeguard meas-
ures an injured importing nation may use to remedy the situa-
tion.397 Thus, the Escape Clause may allow Contracting Parties,
upon a proper showing and determination, to provide some pro-
tection for injured domestic industries such as audiovisual pro-
ducers. Before taking any safeguard measures, however, the na-
392. This is particularly true because most of the Member States in the Community
have been, and continue to be, close political and military allies (e.g., through NATO)
with the United States.
393. GAT', supra note 87, art. XIX, 55 U.N.T.S. 258.
394. See LOWENFELD, supra note 112, at 320-30; see also RALPH H. FOLSOM &
MICHAEL W. GORDON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS § 9.4 (1995).
395. See LOWENFELD, supra note 112, at 325-26.
396. Agreement on Safeguards, art. 11-14, in Marrakesh Agreement, supra note
146, at 11-14-1 [hereinafter Safeguards Agreement]. A footnote to Article Two provides
that in the case of a customs union, such as the Community, the injury determination
may be made on the basis of injury to the customs union or on an individual Member
State basis.
397. See id. art. 5.
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tion in question must first conduct a formal investigation within
the GATT into the cause and extent of injury to the domestic
industry."' Furthermore, the GATT requires a party charged
with injuring the domestic industry to be given the opportunity
to present its case before the determination-rendering national
body.399
Although the parties largely ignored the Escape Clause 400
during the course of the Uruguay Round negotiations on trade
in audiovisuals, it presents a potentially viable and desirable
method by which the Community could impose quantitative re-
strictions on imported audiovisuals and still comply with the
GATT and the spirit of free trade.40 1 Use of the Escape Clause is
particularly desirable because it would open up to international
scrutiny40 2 any determination made by the Community that: (1)
imported items were injuring its domestic industry to a degree
necessary to constitute actionable injury under Article XIX, and
(2) the respective cause or causes of that injury.4°3 Furthermore,
in the event that interested parties do not agree with the deter-
mination, the Escape Clause allows for the possibility of recourse
to the new dispute procedure adopted during the Uruguay
Round. In the event that bilateral or multilateral consultations
prove unsuccessful, the new dispute procedure allows one or
both of the parties to appeal to an objective, independent WTO
398. See Shao, supra note 5, at 148; see also LOWENFELD, supra note 112, at 325-29.
The nation in question must regularly report its findings at three separate stages of the
determination-making process to the GATT. See Safeguards Agreement, supra note 396,
art. 12.
399. See Safeguards Agreement, supra note 396, art. 12.
400. See Shao, supra note 5, at 148.
401. See id. ("If countries want to strengthen or rebuild their cultural industries,
they should invoke [the Escape Clause] rather than some general notion of 'cultural
sovereignty.'").
402. See id. (Through use of Article XIX, "[tihe international community could...
more concretely assess and agree upon the reasonableness of departures from core
GATT principles."). Article Twelve of the Safeguards Agreement, Notification and
Consultation, provides that consultations take place with interested parties and that any
determination be fully explained and publicly disseminated. Safeguards Agreement,
supra note 396, art. 12. These determinations take place at three different levels, initiat-
ing an investigation, making a finding of serious injury, or taking a decision to apply a
safeguard measure. Id.
403. Article Four of the Safeguards Agreement, Determination of Serious Injury or
Threat Thereof, sets forth the methodology and method by which an injury determina-
tion should be conducted. Safeguards Agreement, supra note 396, art. 4.
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panel.4 °4 The Community, however, has not yet taken formal
action to initiate the requisite proceeding under the Escape
Clause that could eventually allow it to impose quantitative re-
strictions as an acceptable safeguard measure under Article XIX.
B. U.S. Trade Law - Section 301
As mentioned above,405 when the Community first adopted
the Directive, the House of Representatives passed a resolution
strongly urging the United States Trade Representative
("USTR") to consider bringing an action against the Community
under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.406 Section
301 (a) (1), requires the USTR to take retaliatory action, subject
to any specific directions from the President, if the USTR deter-
mines that any of the following events have occurred:
(A) the rights of the United States under any trade agree-
ment are being denied; or
(B) an act, policy or practice of a foreign country-
(i) violates, or is inconsistent with, the provisions of, or
otherwise denies benefits to the United States under, any
trade agreement, or
(ii) is unjustifiable and burdens or restricts United
States commerce .. 407
If the USTR determines that any of these events have occurred,
the USTR may take retaliatory action under a broad grant of
authority,4° s including the right to "suspend, withdraw, or pre-
vent the application of trade agreement concessions," 40 9 and to
"impose duties or other import restrictions on the goods of, and,
notwithstanding any other provision of law, fees or restrictions
on the services of, such foreign country for such time as the
[USTR] determines appropriate .... "410
Due to the dual nature of the violations actionable under
section 301, the United States may allege two distinct Commu-
404. Id. art. 14.
405. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
406. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994).
407. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (1) (A) (1994).
408. Again, the USTR may receive specific directions from the President regarding
how to retaliate against a country that has violated § 301. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)
(1994).
409. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1)(A) (1994).
410. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1)(B) (1994).
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nity violations under section 301, one for violation of the GATT
and one for unjustifiably burdening or restricting U.S. com-
merce.411 In the event that the United States seeks recourse
under section 301, the Community will undoubtedly argue that
the United States must first seek resolution of the dispute under
the new dispute resolution procedures adopted during the Uru-
guay Round.4 1 Article XXIII of The Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes provides,
in pertinent part:
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obliga-
tions or other nullification or impairment of benefits under
the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment
of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have
recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this
Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation
has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or im-
paired or that the attainment of any objective of the cov-
ered agreements has been impaired, except through re-
course to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules
and procedures of this Understanding .... 413
411. See Kessler, supra note 17, at 580. A brief overview of the second potential
claim, that the Directive unjustifiably burdens or restricts United States commerce, is in
order. Section 301 (d) (3) (A) provides that an "act, policy, or practice is unreasonable if
the act, policy, or practice, while not necessarily in violation of, or inconsistent with, the
international legal rights of the United States, is otherwise unfair and equitable." Sec-
tion 301(d) (3) (B) sets forth a nonexclusive list of what may be considered an unreason-
able act, policy or practice. Section 301(d)(3)(5) specifies that "[a]cts, policies, and
practices that are discriminatory include . . . any act, policy, or practice which denies
national or most-favored-nation treatment to United States goods, services, or invest-
ment." In light of the U.S. allegations that the Directive violates National or MFN
Treatment, the United States may therefore have a cognizable claim that the Directive
unjustifiably burdens or restricts U.S. commerce within the meaning of 19 U.S.C.
§ 2411(a) (1) (B) (ii). See Kessler, supra note 17, at 580.
It should be noted that the standard for finding a violation under the second part
of section 301 [i.e., 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)(B)(ii)] is more easily met than the level of
trade interference required under the first part. See Kessler, supra note 17, at 580. It
also bears mention that retaliation by the USTR, pursuant to the second part of section
301, is discretionary, not mandatory. This discretionary retaliation is the same as under
the first part of section 301. See LOWENFELD, supra note 112, at 116-17.
412. See supra notes 287-88 and accompanying text; see also Kessler, supra note 17,
at 582.
413. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes, in Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 146, art. XXIII, at ILA2-17.
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While the Community may argue that Article XXIII restricts
the ability of the United States to use section 301 without prior
authorization from the GATT,4 14 the United States can argue
compellingly that no such procedural restriction should apply
because the parties expressly chose to leave the dispute outside
of the agreements reached during the Uruguay Round. Thus,
the United States should not now be required to follow the new
dispute resolution procedure to resolve the dispute.415 Indeed,
the United States currently contends that relief under section
301 is still a fully viable option, and has threatened to use it
against the Community.416 The United States is on solid ground
in arguing that the new dispute resolution procedures should
not apply to the instant dispute because the parties expressly
chose to leave the dispute outside of the purview of the Uruguay
Round agreements. The United States should not now be com-
pelled to follow the new procedures it expressly thought it had
avoided.417
IV. EVALUATION OF THE ARGUMENTS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
The current dispute between the United States and the
414. Kessler, supra note 17, at 582. The Community also points to the statement
by GATT spokesman David Woods. Woods explained that if the United States wanted
to challenge the Directive, it must do so within the confines of the GATT rules. New
Threat of U.S. Retaliation on Audiovisual Sector, EUROPEAN REP., No. 1934, Mar. 16, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File.
415. See Kessler, supra note 17, at 582, 602. The United States gains support for its
argument from the specific language used in the Dispute Settlement Understanding
which applies only to "covered agreements." Thus, the United States would argue that
the procedure is not relevant to the instant and intentionally unresolved dispute. See id.
Even if the United States and the Community were to conduct consultations under the
new dispute settlement procedure, the United States maintains that it may resort to
section 301 if the Community fails to abide by its GATT obligations. See id. at 582.
416. President Clinton's Submission to Congress of Documents Concerning Uruguay Round
Agreement Dec. 15, 1993 (text), DAILY REP. FOR EXEc. (BNA), at 4 (Dec. 17, 1993); GATT
and the Uruguay Round, DAILY REP. FOR EXEC. (BNA), at NS19 (Jan. 31, 1994). In April
1994, the USTR identified the Community as a potential target for retaliatory action
under § 301. See United States Trade Representative, Press Release, Hills Announces
Implementation of Special 301 and Title VII (Apr. 26, 1991) [hereinafter USTR Press
Release 1991] (announcing placement of European Community on "Special 301 Prior-
ity Watch List"). The USTR had placed the Community on the same list in 1991. Id.
417. See Kessler, supra note 17, at 582-83. Furthermore, the United States has
shown good faith in its prior negotiations with the Community that were conducted
under the (then-existing) GATT dispute settlement procedures. See supra notes 106-13
and accompanying text.
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Community poses many complicated, multifaceted issues. In-
deed, the dispute may be analogized to peeling an onion; once
one layer of issues is removed, another layer, posing different
but related issues, is revealed, which in turn must be resolved
and removed before moving on to the next layer.
The U.S. claims under the GATT are relatively straightfor-
ward. The GATT sets out the basic rules for conducting interna-
tional trade.418 It also provides procedures for consultations
and, in the event that an agreement cannot be reached, provides
for dispute resolution within the WTO, the GATT's successor.41
The basic premise behind the GATT, articulated in its various
articles, is the belief that nations holding a comparative advan-
tage in the production of certain goods and services should be
able to produce and sell these goods and services internationally
with minimal interference by importing countries.42 0 In the ag-
gregate, exploitation of comparative advantage maximizes effi-
ciency and, thus, furthers consumers' economic and presumably
political well being.42 1 As a general principle, exceptions from
these free trade principles which would otherwise violate the ba-
sic core trading principles contained in the GATT should be
made only upon a showing of compelling need and persuasive
evidence that the objective being is sought will be satisfied.
Otherwise, poorly tailored restrictive trade practices will unfairly
hinder international trade based on comparative advantage.422
The threshold issue of whether trade in audiovisuals should
be considered trade in goods or services is, at best, problematic.
As evidenced above, good arguments exist to support either con-
tention.423 The respective strengths of these arguments indicate
that, due to the very nature of audiovisuals, the decision to class-
ify audiovisuals as one or the other will not be entirely satisfying.
418. See supra notes 81-92 and accompanying text. The Contracting Parties to the
GATT conduct the vast majority of all world trade. Smith, supra note 14, at 109. Given
its pervasiveness, the GATT, in a certain sense, may be considered the common law of
international trade.
419. See LOWENFELD, supra note 112, at 308-20; see also supra note 112 and accom-
panying text.
420. See supra notes 81-92 and accompanying text.
421. See Shao, supra note 5, at 136; See also supra notes 81-92 and accompanying
text.
422. See Shao, supra note 5, at 136.
423. See supra notes 169-224 and accompanying text.
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The traditional definitional criteria 42 are largely unhelpful in
making this determination, making it necessary to look else-
where. As discussed above, the United States could make a com-
pelling argument that trade in audiovisuals must be considered
trade in goods under the "necessary form of the transaction"
test, which, based on the nature of trade in audiovisuals, appears
to be the test best suited to aid in making such a determina-
tion.425 This test most accurately captures the actual practice of
the GATT and other institutions in determining whether trade
in a certain item should be trade in goods covered by the GATT.
Moreover, this test leads to a practically desirable result: the
same liberalized trade rules that apply to other goods will govern
trade in audiovisuals, as well as many services under the GATS.
As international trade practices become increasingly liberalized,
it makes sense that the same trade rules apply to trade in goods,
services, and hybrid items such as audiovisuals.
With regard to the claimed non-binding nature of the Di-
rective, the Community's demonstrated efforts to enforce the Di-
rective's requirements undermined the Community's argument
that the Directive is only politically binding. Simply claiming
that a requirement is not legally binding, when that requirement
is treated as a de facto law is not only an exercise in cognitive
dissonance, but also contradicts the fundamental spirit of the
GATT, which seeks to ensure transparency and avoid circumven-
tion of the GATT's basic free trade principles by opening Con-
tracting Parties' trade practices up to international scrutiny.426
While the goods/service classification of audiovisuals is a
problematic threshold issue for the United States, the United
States is on solid ground when it argues the Directive violates
Articles I (MFN),427 III (National Treatment) 428 and XI (Ban on
Quantitative Restrictions) of the GATT.429 As discussed above,
the Directive, on its face, violates Article I's MFN requirement by
defining "European works" as works originating from countries
other than those within the Community.430 Thus, the Directive
424. See supra notes 179-92.
425. See supra notes 206-24 and accompanying text.
426. See supra notes 81-92 and accompanying text.
427. See supra notes 114-24 and accompanying text.
428. See supra notes 125-58 and accompanying text.
429. See supra notes 159-66 and accompanying text.
430. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text. Recall that the customs union
[Vol, 20:90
1996] TELEVISION WITHOUT FRONTIERS
treats European, but non-Community, works more favorably
than it treats non-European works, a clear violation of MFN.43 '
The Directive also facially violates Article III's National Treat-
ment requirement by impermissibly limiting the percentage of
Community airtime that may be devoted to non-European pro-
gramming. This requirement gives domestic programmers a
substantial advantage in the Community at the expense of for-
eign programmers." 2 The Directive and its mandated national
Member State legislation thus clearly violates the National Treat-
ment requirement. 3 Although proof that the Directive violates
both Articles I and III should be enough to support the U.S.
claims, the United States also could argue convincingly that the
local content requirement functions as a violation of Article XI's
Ban on Quantitative Restrictions due to its de facto impact as a
trade restraint on audiovisual imports.43 4
Perhaps the best indication of the strength of the U.S.
claims is the Community's practically nonexistent attempts to
justify the Directive under the language operative provisions of
the above Articles which form the backbone of the GATT;
rather, the Community has focused its defense of the Directive
provision in Article XXIV of the GATT does not immunize the Directive's restrictions
because the Directive applies to all European works, including non-Community Euro-
pean works. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
431. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text; see also Kessler, supra note 17,
at 571; Smith, supra note 14, at 100 ("[T]he Directive discriminates against foreign
programs by forcing stations to give preferential treatment to European-produced tele-
vision programs.").
432. See supra notes 133-66 and accompanying text; see also Kessler, supra note 17,
at 571-72. The Directive also violates the National Treatment requirement contained in
the GATS which "requires not only that parties treat the service suppliers of other par-
ties no less favorably than they treat domestic service suppliers, but it also demands that
parties ensure that their domestic laws and regulations do not create competitive disad-
vantages for foreign service providers in the domestic market." General Agreement on
Trade in Services, in Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 146, art. XVII(1), Annex 1B-18
[hereinafter GATS]; Kessler, supra note 17, at 575. Article XVII(3) of the GATS pro-
vides, "[flormally identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be less
favourable if it modifies the conditions of competition in favour of services or service
suppliers of the Member compared to like services or service suppliers of any other
Member." GATS, supra, art. XVII(3), at Annex lb-18; Kessler, supra note 17, at 575
n.70.
433. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. This is also true for national laws
such as those in France that provide subsidies for domestic film industries. See Kessler,
supra note 17, at 575; see also supra note 304 and accompanying text.
434. See supra notes 159-66 and accompanying text (describing United States' argu-
ment that Directive violates GATT Article XI Ban on Quantitative Restrictions).
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on various possible exceptions to these Articles.4 35 These excep-
tions are addressed in ascending order of difficulty. The least
compelling argument, apparently only a "throw-in" defense, is
the possible application of the National Security Exception.
This limited exception has been narrowly construed to apply
only to matters impacting directly upon national security.4"6
Trade in audiovisuals, as was true for the availability of shoes in
Sweden, hardly has direct implications on national security and,
thus, this argument should fail.
The Community's Public Morals Clause argument likewise
should fail. The Public Morals Clause has never been applied to
matters of such a sweeping nature as trade in all audiovisuals.
Rather, it has been restricted to items that might have a direct
and immediate impact on public morals, such as the import of
objectionable pornography.3 7 The Directive, however, does not
attempt to distinguish between imported programming that
might have such a direct and immediate adverse effect on public
morals and programming that would not offend, or perhaps
even enhance, public morality. Due to the Directive's impermis-
sible overbreadth, the Community's argument should fail.
The third argument the Community could raise, the possi-
ble application of Article XIX's Escape Clause, 43 8 is premature;
the Community has put the cart before the horse. Escape Clause
safeguard measures may only be invoked after an injured im-
porting country has demonstrated that import competition is in-
juring or threatening to injure its domestic industry.43 9 By
adopting the Directive without first complying with the demand-
ing procedural requirements mandated before safeguard meas-
ures may be applied, the Community has acted to restrict im-
ports without making the requisite showing of both injury and a
causal nexus.44 Since the Community has failed to conduct
435. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
436. See supra notes 388-92 and accompanying text (discussing limitation of Na-
tional Security Exception to issues of national security).
437. See supra notes 380-81 and accompanying text (describing use of Public
Morals Clause to restrict importation of pornography).
438. See supra notes 393-404 and accompanying text (discussing use of Escape
Clause to support validity of Directive).
439. See supra notes 398-99 and accompanying text; see also LOWENFELD, supra note
112, at 320-30. See generally Folsom & Gordon, supra note 99, at 309-36 (discussing escape
clause or market disruption proceedings under Trade Act of 1974).
440. An injured importing country must demonstrate both injury and causation
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such an investigation which would be open to international scru-
tiny, it cannot presently avail itself of Article XIX.
The Community's last two arguments are somewhat inter-
twined. As mentioned above, the Community has argued that
trade in television programming should be governed by the
same rules that apply to trade in cinematographic films. 4 1 This,
the Community argues, is necessary to account for the cultural
impact of audiovisuals.442 While the existence of a special provi-
sion for trade in cinematographic films might undercut the U.S.
position to some extent, it does not mean that a culture excep-
tion, general or limited, should be implied or created within the
core trading principles of the GATS absent explicit multilateral
support and approval. 44 Rather, the proper role of the Cinema
Exception must be interpreted in light of the drafters' intent
and the Contracting Parties' subsequent interpretation and ap-
plication of the exception. 4  As the history of the Cinema Ex-
ception itself demonstrates, 445 the Contracting Parties specifi-
cally limited the exception to apply only to cinematographic
films; extension of the exception to trade in television program-
ming was explicitly disapproved." 6 In light of the fact the Con-
tracting Parties expressly decided not to include television pro-
gramming within the ambit of Article IV and the United States
and other audiovisual exporting countries have been consist-
ently and strenuously opposed since the very beginning of the
GATT to any proposal to include trade in television program-
ming within the Cinema Exception, the United States and other
audiovisual exporting countries should not now have such an ex-
ception for trade in television programming forced upon
them .
before availing itself of the remedies contained in Article XIX. See LOWENFELD, supra
note 112, at 325-26. Article II of the Safeguards Agreement expressly provides that a
safeguard measure may be applied only if the importing country is able to make the
requisite showing of injury and causation. Safeguards Agreement, supra note 396, art.
2.
441. See supra notes 259-99; see also Presburger & Tyler, supra note 14, at 507;
Smith, supra note 14, at 129.
442. See supra notes 289-91 and accompanying text; see also Shao, supra note 5, at
141-49; Filipek, supra note 3, at 351-52.
443. See Smith, supra note 14, at 129.
444. Id. at 100, 180.
445. See supra notes 259-99 and accompanying text.
446. See supra notes 268-99 and accompanying text.
447. See Smith, supra note 14, at 129.
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Implying such an exception would seriously undermine the
fundamental understanding that the GATT's operative articles
and exceptions function on the basis of multilateral consensus.
The artificial adoption of such a broad exception obviously
would violate to this fundamental principle. Such an un-
predecented expansion of the exception would completely un-
dermine the explicit and well documented U.S. understanding
of the exception and would effectively deny the United States
the benefit of the bargain it struck in 1962."8 Furthermore,
such an expansion would jeopardize the faith that all Con-
tracting Parties have in the GATT. 449
With these important observations in mind, the proper role
of the Cinema Exception should be expressly contained to that
purpose it was originally intended to serve, a limited exception
on the import of cinematographic films and nothing more.4"'
This narrow interpretation is consistent with the GATT's treat-
ment of other items such as books, magazines, radio programs,
and musical recordings that also may impact upon culture.451 It
is also consistent with the general principles of the GATT and its
broad prohibition against trade restraints.45 2 The position of the
United States and other audiovisual exporting countries has
been clear since 1962; the Community should not now be able to
successfully argue that the Cinema Exception extends to cover
trade in audiovisuals when the record plainly demonstrates that
no consensus exists on such a sweeping extension of the nar-
rowly tailored GATT exception. Such an extension simply can-
not be implied from the mere existence of Article IV."3
To say that the Cinema Exception should not apply to the
instant dispute is not to say that the Community's concern over
cultural integrity must be entirely disregarded in favor of free
448. See id. (stating "[a]rticle IV reflects a compromise in which the United States
accepted a narrow exception for national treatment in an industry it dominated, and, in
return, the scope of the exception was limited to one medium, film, and one type of
discrimination, screen quotas.").
449. See id.
450. See id.
451. See supra notes 201-03 and accompanying text; see also Smith, supra note 14, at
129-30.
452. See Smith, supra note 14, at 129.
453. See id. at 130 (stating "[e]xtending the scope of Article IV to television pro-
grams would not only allow a restriction on trade the original GATT drafters prohib-
ited, it would also allow a restriction on trade the Contracting Parties refused to allow in
1962.").
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trade. The Community's culture exception argument raises a
basic policy issue or whether free trade principles have any desir-
able limit.45 4 The GATT recognizes as one of its fundamental
principles the importance of economic efficiency455 and essen-
tially codifies this as the standard against which trade policies
should be measured.4 56 At the same time, however, the Con-
tracting Parties to the GATT and, indeed, the GATT itself, to the
extent it covers trade in cinematographic films, recognize that
other values such as distributive and social justice, including cul-
tural integrity, must also rightly be considered with regard to in-
ternational trade in goods and services having attendant exter-
nalities.457 With European cultural integrity pitted against GATT
integrity, the present dispute raises important policy issues that
strike at the core of the GATT and its newborn successor, the
WTO. 4
58
Few will argue that cultural integrity and preservation are
not worthy goals, but very serious problems indisputably exist
with regard to the method by which the Community seeks to
achieve these proclaimed goals, a method which, by its terms,
invites protectionism through the use of an arbitrary and poorly
tailored definitional criteria.459 The creation of a general or in-
dustry-specific culture exception presents serious danger to the
GATT system and the existing world trade order.460 While cul-
tural concerns may be legitimate, any attempt to fashion a cul-
454. See Shao, supra note 5, at 107.
455. See supra note 90 and accompanying text; see also Shao, supra note 5, at 107.
456. See Shao, supra note 5, at 107-08.
457. See id. at 107 & n.l1, 149. As one commentator phrased the issue, might free
trade in audiovisuals "lead to excessive social and political uniformity or somehow un-
duly restrict the creative freedom of societies to pursue their own goals?" JACKSON,
supra note 81, at 28-29. Stating the issue somewhat more dramatically, French Presi-
dent Francois Mitterrand asked, "[w]ho can be blind today to the threat of a world
gradually invaded by an identical culture, Anglo-Saxon culture, under the cover of eco-
nomic liberalism? .... Are the laws of money and technology about to achieve what the
totalitarian regimes failed to do?" See Charles Bremmer, Mitterrand Enlists Old Empire in
Linguistic Defence of Gaul, THE TIMES (LONDON), Oct. 19, 1993, at 11. Culture, of course,
is not a static entity, and there is a risk that countries strictly enforcing or enhancing the
local content requirement may lead to cultural rigidification. Perhaps President Mitter-
rand overlooks the important role that supply and demand plays in the marketplace of
ideas and the resulting impact on the formation of dynamic culture. Cf Shao, supra
note 5, at 136-45.
458. See Shao, supra note 5, at 107; Smith, supra note 14, at 98-99.
459. Shao, supra note 5, at 145-47.
460. See id. at 146-48, 149.
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ture exception must be based on persuasive evidence, reasonably
tailored to achieve that goal in order to be considered a legiti-
mate exception within the GATT.461 Otherwise, a poorly tai-
lored culture exception could seriously undermine international
understanding of the conduct of economic relations and imperil
international support for free trade based on comparative advan-
tage. 462
As demonstrated above, the Directive, as it currently exists,
is impermissibly overbroad.46 1 The Directive's definition of what
constitutes a European work, its proxy for what constitutes Euro-
pean culture worthy of protection, is based on the nationality of
production companies and the personnel involved in a given
work.464 Such a broad definition of protected works is inher-
ently arbitrary46 5 and invites abuse in favor of protectionist re-
gimes.4 6 The GATT seeks, as an underlying principle, to pre-
vent arbitrary and unfair governmental intrusion into free
trade.46 ' The artificial delineation of culture on the basis of na-
tionality, given the cross-cultural nature of culture, manifests the
Directive's arbitrariness; national boundaries are simply poor
proxies for overlapping and amorphous cultural spheres. 468 Fur-
461. See id. at 136, 146-48, 149-50.
462. See id. at 146-48, 149-50.
463. See supra notes 373-79 and accompanying text; see also Shao, supra note 5, at
149-50.
464. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
465. See supra notes 373-79; see also Shao, supra note 5, at 149-50.
466. One commentator aptly phrased the significant problems associated with the
problems of the Directive's arbitrariness as:
The arbitrariness of content regulation or regulation based on national origin
is pivotal in the analysis because of the role that governments play in trade
relations. The integrity of the GAT'T relies implicitly but critically on the idea
that government should not act arbitrarily. Without this idea, none of the
premises behind the GATT could survive. Allowing governments to use [au-
diovisual] import restrictions would thus severely undermine the GATT be-
cause any such government restrictions would clearly be arbitrary and unfair.
Sanctioning them would set a dangerous precedent for the entire trading sys-
tem .... Permitting governments to discriminate against particular [audiovi-
sual] imports would undermine the basic premises of an existing world trade
order whose concern goes well beyond the [audiovisual] sector.
Shao, supra note 5, at 147.
467. See, e.g., id.
468. See supra notes 373-79 and accompanying text; see also Shao, supra note 5, at
140, 141, 146, 149 (stating "[p]olitical boundaries and cultural boundaries simply do
not correspond in a way that permits rational and meaningful import discrimination
..... ). In fact, cultural affinities may well account for the popularity of U.S. films and
television programs abroad. Shao, supra note 5, at 140.
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thermore, the Directive does not account for the quality of a Eu-
ropean program receiving preferential treatment simply because
European personnel filmed it in Europe.469 There is something
intellectually dishonest about treating an episode of "Dallas" as a
European work deserving protection because it supposedly pre-
serves or fosters European culture simply because it was filmed
in Paris with European personnel, while a foreign-produced doc-
umentary on the French Revolution or on European art, history,
architecture, or the like, is treated as potentially corrosive of Eu-
ropean cultural integrity.470
Rather than being reasonably tailored to further European
cultural concerns, the Directive's local content requirement is
more aptly tailored to further the economic interests of Euro-
pean producers and entertainment personnel. The protection-
ist concerns are amplified by the fact the Directive does not set a
limit on the percentage of European works that may receive
preferential treatment. Thus, conceptually, a Member State
could elect to enact a national law requiring one hundred per-
cent European works,4 71 a blatant affront to the concept of com-
parative advantage and fundamental GATT principles.
At the same time, however, the rejection of a cultural excep-
tion for trade in audiovisuals does not mean that trade in audi-
ovisuals should be treated exactly like trade in any regular com-
modity, good, or service lacking attendant externalities.4 7 The
unique characteristics of externalities associated with trade in
audiovisuals may require some form of special treatment, but
whatever form of preferential treatment is actually provided
must be based on reasonably tailored criteria and persuasive evi-
dence that such treatment will indeed protect and further Euro-
pean culture. The Directive, as currently formulated, falls well
short of these requirements.
Various potential fora exist for resolving the instant dispute.
One potential avenue of redress is for the United States to bring
unilateral action against the Community under section 301 of
the Trade Act of 1974.173 If the United States were to take such
469. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 358.
470. See id.
471. See supra notes 56, 261.
472. See supra notes 313-31 and accompanying text; see also Shao, supra note 5, at
149.
473. See supra notes 405-417 and accompanying text.
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action, however, the Community, due to the highly-contested na-
ture of the dispute and the adversarial positions of the parties,
would most likely appeal to the WTO.4 74 At the same time, uni-
lateral action under section 301 would create animosity in the
international community, particularly among the Contracting
Parties. Although the United States maintains otherwise, the in-
ternational community largely has regarded the new, strength-
ened dispute resolution procedures adopted during the Uru-
guay Round as signalling the end to, or at least a reduction of,
unilateral action by the United States under section 301.475 Uni-
lateral action under section 301 may, thus, have significant polit-
ical consequences by signifying dissent over a major issue within
the international trading order. This, in turn, might generate
uncertainty and create disillusionment among Contracting Par-
ties about the effectiveness of the entire WTO system at a time
when the fledgling organization can least afford it.
With these potential political consequences in mind, the
United States may be better advised to bring the dispute before
the WTO. Bringing the dispute before the WTO also is benefi-
cial from a legal perspective because the WTO is considered part
of the Community's law hierarchy, ranking above secondary reg-
ulations such as the Directive and Member States' national legis-
lation.4 76 But even bringing a complaint before the WTO may
pose delicate political questions. Since the WTO binds both the
Community and the individual Member States, the United States
could challenge either the Directive or the various Member
States' national legislation.4 77 Thus, rather than confront the
entire Community, the United States might wish to focus its con-
test on the national laws of a particular Member State, such as
474. Additionally, countries appealing unilateral action by the United States under
§ 301 have been successful in getting the United States to drop or rescind its retaliatory
measures. For example, in 1988, Brazil appealed such unilateral action by the United
States under § 301 to the GATT. After negotiations failed, and a GATT panel was fi-
nally formed to resolve the dispute, the United States abdicated and dropped the retali-
atory measures it had instituted. See LOWENFELD, supra note 112, at 134-39.
475. See id. at 310.
476. See International Fruit Co. v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit, Joined
Cases 21-24/72, [1972] E.C.R. 1219, [1972] 2 C.M.L.R. 697; International Fruit Co. v.
Commission, Joined Cases 41-44/70, [1971] E.C.R. 411, [1971] 2 C.M.L.R. 515; Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann, Application of GATT by the Court ofJustice of the European Communities,
20 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 397, 402 (1983); see also BERMANN, supra note 22, at 952 &
1995 Supp. at 200.
477. Smith, supra note 14, at 120.
[Vol. 20:90
TELEVISION WTHOUT FRONTIERS
France, which has actively enforced its laws.478 An action against
France would, of course, have a broader effect on all Member
States, but it probably would be seen as less confrontational to
other Member States and could serve to preserve what, at that
point, would likely already be strained relations with the United
States.479
But more than potential political fallout might be at stake
by bringing the dispute before the WTO. The WTO is a new,
relatively untried, organization. While it holds tremendous
promise in resolving future trade disputes, it may simply be too
early to bring a conflict of such significance before the WTO
before it has had an opportunity to decide less charged trade
disputes and has built up stature as an established and well-
respected body for resolving international trade disputes. A
finding entirely in favor either of the United States or the Com-
munity may well symbolically sound the death knell for the
promising young organization.
While efforts to negotiate a resolution to the dispute failed
during the Uruguay Round,48 ° the difficult issues raised by the
Directive, viz., the tension between free trade and cultural integ-
rity, virtually beg for a compromise agreeable to all interested
parties. 481 Although the parties were not able to reach a com-
478. As demonstrated above, France has been the most aggressive and vocal Mem-
ber State defending the Directive from U.S. attacks. See Kessler, supra note 17, at 563.
From the outset, France has actively enforced its restrictions against non-European pro-
gramming and even fined a station US$10 million, which led to the channel's failure.
Diana L. Dougan, Europe Draws an Electronic Curtain; Barriers to U.S. Films, TV to Protect
Culture Cast an Ominous Shadow on the Emerging Global Information Highway, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 14, 1994, at B7.
479. See Smith, supra note 14, at 120.
480. See supra notes 281-99 and accompanying text.
481. According to one commentator:
For the United States, realism demands a recognition that the Directive, in-
cluding its quota for European works, is an accomplished fact. Although ear-
lier the debate in the United States centered on whether the Bush Administra-
tion should support a "soft" quota or resist the imposition of a quota alto-
gether, attention should now shift towards persuading the Community to
administer the new regime in a way that will minimize damage to U.S. exports.
Filipek, supra note 3, at 366. This same commentator further observed:
The ultimate goal of negotiations should be to ensure that, over time, U.S.
access to the [Community] market does not diminish as a result of the Euro-
pean works quota. This aim would be consistent with the spirit of the [GATT]
and with its rules permitting a group of Contracting Parties to harmonize na-
tional trade rules in order to form a customs union, provided that the degree
of restriction on trade outside the union does not, on the whole, increase.
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promise during the Uruguay Round, in part because of their
strong ideological differences,48 2 it is clear that a resolution of
the dispute, either via unilateral action under section 301 or
under the WTO dispute resolution procedures in favor of one
party stands to injure the valuable working relationship between
the United States and the Community, as well as possibly under-
mine the still fledgling WTO.488 In light of the importance the
dispute could have on world trade and the WTO, the parties
should take a realistic approach to resolving the dispute, prefera-
bly within the existing framework of the GATT.484
Notwithstanding the fact that a multilateral consensus does
not exist with regard to the creation of an overall or specified
cultural exception within the GATT, 48 5 there is a widely-shared
recognition among nations that trade in audiovisuals may create
externalities the GATT's general provisions do not adequately
capture.486 At the same time, however, sovereignty concerns
must be balanced against the need to maintain free trade, in-
cluding trade in audiovisuals.487 Any eventual resolution of the
dispute must take these factors into account in formulating an
acceptable compromise that furthers the respective goals of each
of the parties.
Trade theorists generally agree that the costs of domestic
industry protection are minimized when governments narrowly
focus their protection on achieving the result sought.488 From
this well-established vantage point, the Community's local con-
tent requirement is entirely ineffective at encouraging programs
produced in Europe or elsewhere that promote European cul-
ture. 489 This is true because the sole criterion for what consti-
Id. at 370.
482. See supra notes 281-99 and accompanying text.
483. Indeed, the dispute, along with other disputes, almost caused the Uruguay
Round to collapse. See, e.g., Roger Cohen, Culture Dispute With Paris Now Snags World
Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1993; Roger Cohen, Film Issue Snags Trade Talks, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 13, 1993.
484. See supra note 481.
485. See supra notes 258-99 and accompanying text.
486. See supra notes 313-31 and accompanying text.
487. See Smith, supra note 14, at 135.
488. Id. at 134 (citing PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL EC-
ONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY 220 (2d ed. 1991)). This principle, in conjunction with
the parties' GATT obligations, should play an integral role in resolving the dispute on
amicable, if somewhat imperfect, terms. Id.
489. See id.
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tutes a "European work" is nationality. 490 It does not, therefore,
guarantee that the European programs actually aired will reflect
the aspects of European culture that the Community and Mem-
ber States value and seek to protect.491 As one commentator has
phrased the issue, the "Community should retract the Directive's
European program requirement and adopt a television policy
which promotes programs reflecting European culture, not
merely programs with a 'Made in Europe' label."49 2 The ques-
tion then is how the Community might most efficiently further
its interest in protecting and promoting European culture while
at the same time not injuring the free trade principles contained
in the GATT.49
One avenue to an amicable resolution may exist within the
GATT; direct, non-export production subsidies to selected Euro-
pean movie and television producers.494 When the Tokyo
Round concluded in 1979, the crowning achievement was an
agreement on subsidies and countervailing duties.493 The impe-
tus on agreements on subsidies carried over into the Uruguay
Round, where the Contracting Parties sought to further clarify
the agreements reached during the Tokyo Round, particularly
with regard to subsidies and countervailing duties.4 96 In these
agreements, the Contracting Parties recognized that domestic,
i.e., non-export, subsidies may be used to protect and further
490. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
491. Smith, supra note 14, at 134. It is not hard to think of examples of U.S. pro-
gramming that may promote European culture more than European programs. For
example, a U.S. documentary on European art, history, or architecture may further
European culture more and more effectively than Benny Hill or an adventure film that
happens to be filmed in Europe with European actors. Cf id. at 134 (contrasting
Eurocop, police show filmed in Spain with Spanish actors involving many car chases
and shoot-outs, with American documentary on Vincent van Gogh).
492. Id.
493. Cf Shao, supra note 5, at 148 (stating "[t]he GATF offers an attractive frame-
work for ensuring that [audiovisuals] are traded freely and without restrictions. Its prin-
ciples of MFN and national treatment, among others, have proven extremely helpful in
reducing international commercial discrimination, and the international community
largely accepts them.").
494. See SMITH, supra note 9, at 135-37 (1980); Smith, supra note 14, at 134-36. Cf
Shao, supra note 5, at 149 (stating, "[i]f necessary, the [Contracting Parties] could...
adopt a sector-specific agreement that addresses [the] peculiarities of the [audiovisual]
industry but that does not sanction import restrictions.").
495. See LOWENFELD, supra note 90, § 7; LOWENFELD, supra note 112, at 275.
496. See LOWENFELD, supra note 112, at 275-79.
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certain important societal and cultural interests and goals.49 7
For example, one of the general provisions in the Subsidies and
Countervailing Duties Code states: "[s]ignatories recognize that
subsidies are used by governments to promote important objec-
tives of social and economic policy."49 Article XI(1), entitled,
"Subsidies Other than Export Subsidies," provides:
Signatories recognize that subsidies other than export subsi-
dies are widely used as important instruments for the promo-
tion of social and economic policy objectives and do not in-
tend to restrict the right of signatories to use such subsidies to
achieve these and other important policy objectives which
they consider desirable. Signatories note that among such
objectives are:
to facilitate the restructuring, under socially acceptable con-
ditions, of certain sectors, especially where this has become
necessary by reason of changes in trade and economic poli-
cies, including international agreements resulting in lower
barriers to trade .. .
Thus, based on the changing trade patterns in audiovisu-
als,5 00 targeted non-export production subsidies by the Commu-
nity to movie and television producers may well fall within the
subsidies provided under Article XI. 50 1 These types of produc-
tion subsidies are thus consistent with the spirit of the GATT's
substantive provisions regarding subsidies,50 2 and because the
Community does not export significant quantities of audiovisual
programming, it is unlikely that the subsidies would be consid-
ered export subsidies in contravention of the GATT. 50' Addi-
497. See Smith, supra note 14, at 135 (explaining that as result of Tokyo Round
"the Contracting Parties prohibited government subsidies of export industries, but did
not prohibit direct government subsidies of industries producing goods only for local
use.").
498. GATf, supra note 87, Subsidies and Countervailing Duties Code, art. VII(1)
(Subsidies-General Provisions).
499. Id. art. XI(1).
500. See supra notes 6-19 and accompanying text.
501. See Smith, supra note 14, at 135.
502. See id.
503. See id.; cf LOWENFELD, supra note 112, at 276-79 (discussing distinctions be-
tween red, yellow, and green light subsidies). In the event that the Community were to
expand its imports, which are currently practically negligible, to the United States, the
United States may be able to impose countervailing duties under Article III of the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. See LOWENFELD, supra note 112,
at 277.
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tionally, these subsidies would allow the Community to more ef-
fectively protect its cultural interest in television programming
by allowing Member States' governments to direct subsidies to
producers they consider most likely to create works of cultural
value.5 °4 Thus, such subsidies could accommodate Member
States' divergent degrees of concern for the preservation of their
national cultures.50 5
Furthermore, these limited, targeted subsidies are, on bal-
ance, consistent with the U.S. free trade position.50 6 In addition
to being the least costly and most effective form of protection for
the Community,0 7 direct production subsidies to selected Euro-
pean television producers also would cause less economic harm
to U.S. exporters. 0 ' This is true because, if the local content
requirement were eliminated, U.S. exporters would be free to
export more programming to the Community. Since the varia-
ble cost of exporting an additional program to the Community is
typically small,50 9 U.S. exporters' profits should increase propor-
tionately with the increased volume of sales made, without suf-
fering much, if any, injury from any disadvantage U.S. exporters
may have relative to the selected group of subsidized European
producers. 510
Thus, it appears that both parties' goals would be substan-
tially achieved by allowing direct non-export domestic subsidies
504. See Smith, supra note 14, at 136.
505. Id. Therefore, a country such as France that apparently values culture very
highly could provide local producers with generous subsidies whereas a country that
emphasizes free trade, such as Germany, would be free to offer limited or no support to
local producers, depending upon its cultural preservation concerns. Id. at 132, 136.
506. Indeed, they seem perfectly consistent with the Subsidies and Countervailing
Duties Code, discussed above. See supra note 498 and accompanying text. The targeted
subsidies would allow the Community to "facilitate the restructuring.., of certain sec-
tors [such as television production and programming] ... where this has become neces-
sary by reason of changes in trade and economic policies .... " GATT, supra note 87,
Subsidies and Counterveiling Duties Code, art. XI(1).
507. See Smith, supra note 14, at 135.
508. Subsidies generally distort trade patterns less than quotas. Thus, the targeted
subsidies will most likely be less costly to the existing economic system than the current
local content requirement. See WARREN M. CORDEN, TRADE POLICY AND ECONOMIC WEL-
FARE 28-30, 121-22 (1974); see also supra note 163 (discussing economic injury caused by
quotas).
509. Because U.S. producers generally recover their production costs in the
United States, the incremental cost of exporting a program to the Community will only
entail the cost of the medium (typically inexpensive video tape) plus transactions costs.
See Shao, supra note 5, at 132-36.
510. See Smith, supra note 14, at 136.
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to Community producers.511 Such a compromise also affords a
reasonable and acceptable middle ground that would enable
both parties to say they stuck by their respective positions and
achieved the goals they sought.512 Furthermore, such a compro-
mise would allow the parties to remain true to the spirit of the
GATT and would help preserve international faith in the WTO
so that it might flourish in the future.51
Of course, there is also the possibility that the parties will
continue to do nothing, i.e., no formal challenge by the United
States 514 and little, if any, enforcement of the Directive or corre-
sponding national legislation in the Community, perhaps under
a liberal interpretation of the "where practicable" clause.515 U.S.
entertainment companies, perhaps in order to hedge their bets
on the outcome of the dispute, have been looking with an ever-
eager eye to aligning themselves with European entertainment
undertakings and have entered into a broad range of interna-
511. One commentator described the desirability of such a compromise as follows:
In recognition of the nexus between international communications and na-
tional culture, the GATT Council could adopt a memorandum of understand-
ing concurrent with the adoption of the panel's report which expressly recog-
nizes that government subsidies to producers of films and television programs
intended for local broadcast are justifiable under GATT's subsidy regime.
Id. at 137. Although such a compromise would require the Community to "pick up the
bill" by raising the funds to support European producers, any such economic concerns
pale in comparison to the harm that might be inflicted if the dispute were to lead to the
fall of the WTO. See supra notes 476-84 and accompanying text. One can think of
various means by which the Community could raise these funds. The Community
could, for example, place a general tax on all audiovisuals. Alternatively, it could take
the money out of its general fund.
512. Such a compromise is infinitely better for the Community, from a political
perspective, than fighting with the United States all the way to a WTO panel, at which
point the Community stands a good chance of losing its substantive case and injuring its
relations with the United States. If a WTO panel were to decide against it, the Commu-
nity could still bring an Escape Clause proceeding under Article XIX of the GATT.
Regardless of the final resolution of such a proceeding, at least both parties would be
acting consistently with the GATT.
513. See Smith, supra note 14, at 137.
514. Cf supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text (explaining that U.S. complaint
has been dormant).
515. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text. As discussed above, certain
Member States, such as France, have been actively enforcing their national laws. Fur-
thermore, it appears that the Commission is also serious about its role as enforcer of the
Directive. See supra notes 147-57, 165, 237-39 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, the
logic of inactivity may inevitably appeal to the Community and individual Member
States in light of the very serious political concerns and concerns regarding the WTO,
particularly if the United States renews its efforts to push its case before the WTO.
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tional co-productions involving the efforts of producers and art-
ists from Europe, the United States, and other nations.5 1 As a
result, many large U.S. studios have acquired, or acquired inter-
ests in, production companies in Europe.517 The last few
months are indicative of this trend. For example, British Sky
Broadcasting ("BSkyB"), which is forty percent owned by Rupert
Murdoch's News Corporation, bought a twenty-five percent in-
terest in Premiere, the leading German pay-TV channel; addi-
tionally, BSkyB has formed a joint venture with Bertelsmann,
one of the world's largest media companies, and Canal Plus, a
French company, to expand pay-TV across Europe.5 1s At
roughly the same time, Viacom entered into a deal with German
media giant Kirch Group to sell Kirch the rights to many of its
Paramount film and television shows. 19 The deal could net
Viacom up to US$2 billion in revenues over the next decade.52 °
More recently, the Walt Disney Company entered into a ten-year
agreement to supply Kirch with exclusive television rights to ex-
isting and future live-action Disney, Touchstone, Hollywood, and
Miramax films. 52 ' These are just a few examples of recent alli-
ances. 522 From all indications, similar alliances will continue in
516. See Filipek, supra note 3, at 369; see also Presburger & Tyler, supra note 14, at
508; cf. Kessler, supra note 17, at 605.
517. Presburger & Tyler, supra note 14, at 509 (discussing Paramount's purchase
of 49% interest in Britain's largest independent television production company, Dis-
ney's establishment and development in France, and NBC's search for acquisition
targets in Europe).
518. See BSkyB Group Invests $270 Million for Stake in German Channel, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 7, 1996, at B8; see also Murdoch in European Pact to Provide Satellite Pay TV, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 7, 1996, at D1; Judy Dempsey, Murdoch learns to be a partner- The link with
BSkyB means a lot to Bertelsmann, Fin. Times, Mar. 14, 1996, at 29. BSkyB, Bertelsmann,
and Canal Plus each hold a 30% stake in the joint venture to explore new pay-TV op-
portunities while French media and advertising group, Havas SA, has a nonvoting 10%
stake. See BSkyB Group Invests $270 Million for Stake in German Channel, supra, at B8.
519. See Wolfgang Munchau, ViacomJoins Kirch in Five-year Alliance, FIN. TIMES, Apr.
9, 1996, at 23. Kirch is Germany's second largest media company. See Sallie
Hofmeister, Viacom, German Firm Agree to Joint TV Venture, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1996, at D6.
520. See Hofmeister, supra note 519, at D6.
521. See Lisa Bannon, Kirch of Germany Gets Pay-TVRights to Disney Movies, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 30, 1996, at ASA.
522. Indeed, one need not look any further than the recent activities of Disney
and Kirch in Germany to find several further examples. For example, in addition to its
recent deal with Kirch, Disney holds a 50% interest in a German broadcast channel
(Bertelsmann also holds an interest in the channel), a 50% interest in a German pro-
gram production and distribution company, as well as a 37.5% interest in a German
cable service. See id. In addition to its recent deals with Viacom and Disney, Kirch also
struck deals with MCA, Warner Brothers, and Columbia in 1996. See id.
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the future.523
V. CONCLUSION
The GATT's free trade principles play an integral role in the
world trading system. These principles, however, may not always
adequately account for externalities associated with trade in cer-
tain items. The Directive attempts to fashion protection for an
industry it deems important to the preservation of European cul-
ture and future integration, but it does so in a simplistic and
unacceptably overbroad manner that is not reasonably tailored
to achieving its proclaimed objective. If anything, the Directive
appears more aptly suited to protecting European economic in-
terests - an objective clearly at odds with multilaterally agreed-
upon trade policies and contrary to the very concept of compara-
tive advantage upon which the GATT is based. Hence, the Di-
rective, as currently drafted and applied, cannot withstand inter-
national scrutiny.
The very nature of the tension between European cultural
integrity and the integrity of the free trading system begs for a
compromise. Such a compromise can be reached in the form of
targeted, non-export subsidies to domestic European producers.
Such subsidies are economically efficient, consistent with the
spirit of the GATT and the Contracting Parties' recognition of
the tension between free trade and cultural integrity, and, most
importantly, will further the interests of both parties while at the
same time preserving international respect for free trade and its
institutions, including the WTO, which will govern international
trade in the future.
523. See, e.g., Elizabeth Jensen, Discovery, BBC Discuss Joint Venture Having Potential
Value of $500 Million, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 1996, at AS; Sallie Hofmeister, MCA Strikes
Huge Deal With German Firms, LA. TIMEs, July 31, 1996, at D1.
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